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Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Siberian MD: Impact of Incoming Withdrawal Units

94UM0123A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Dec 93 p 2

[Interview with Colonel-General Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov, commander, Siberian Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Veklich: "Siberian MD: Officer Companies, Officer Battalions"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In the last 30 months, the Siberian Military District has taken in about 100 units and large units formerly stationed in distant and neighboring countries. Questions relating to problems of providing the necessary level of combat readiness and maintaining troop command and control were put by our correspondent to Colonel General Viktor Kopylov, commander, Siberian Military District.

"Our training," said Viktor Andreyevich, "was before and remains as the rock-bottom requirement. This, in spite of the fact that today it must be organized under conditions of an enormous personnel shortage. The table of organization and equipment of units and large units is only now being finalized. Nevertheless, the district's authorities and the military council maintain their viewpoint, even in light of the difficulties, that our district, which is far removed from the "hot spots," was before and remains as the most favorable relative to organizing combat training. As far as the practical side of the problem is concerned, I can say that in those units in which there are personnel present and combat vehicle crews supplied, the people have been especially well-trained in accomplishing unexpected missions."

[Veklich] Let us make that more definite. Let us assume that a motorized rifle regiment receives a combat alert signal. Are the regiment's subunits in a position to execute a timely departure from their permanent deployment garrisoning location with their combat materiel, accomplish a march of let us say 500 kilometers, and then perform the particular mission assigned?

[Kopylov] As far as extreme conditions are concerned, we have found a way to maintain unit combat capability. We redeploy our personnel and equipment so as not to spread too thinly our woefully inadequate number of specialists. We reassign some specialists to make up for manpower deficits in subunits, so that the latter can assume a state of complete readiness to undertake any mission. Others are trained to man equipment, in the event of an irregular situation, to enable them to move combat vehicles out of motor pools before the reserve is mobilized. This approach has become associated with the need to devote greater attention to individual training of personnel. We have come to make more extensive use of fighting vehicle gunnery training facilities and simulators.

[Veklich] But there is quite a number of units consisting of officers only. They sometimes must carry out not only their regular duties, but other duties as well, such as guard duty and servicing and repair of equipment.

[Kopylov] The problem is indeed serious. The conduct of company or battalion tactical exercises in reduced-strength units produces poor results. Also, an officer who has not worked through problems of commander's training and fire control and who is lacking personnel to boot simply faces the threat of disqualification. With this kind of situation in mind, we in the district took the route of creating, on the basis of units, reduced-strength officer battalions and companies. This year's experience shows that our action has been justified. A young school graduate - a platoon leader - who lacks personnel due to no fault of ours can in the course of an integrated exercise hone his skills both in the role of a BMP [combat infantry vehicle] driver-mechanic or sniper, something which will undoubtedly be of use to him, and in subunit command and control and combat organization. And so it goes up the chain of command, to regimental commander.

Although we have employed the above procedure as an experiment, in the new training year integrated training of officers lacking personnel under their command will become a part of routine combat training.

[Veklich] The Siberian Military District recently participated in the operational-strategic command and staff exercise "Center." What goals were achieved?

[Kopylov] The district was generally rated highly. We carried out a number of actions on an experimental basis. We drew up proposals based on them for submission to the General Staff. This included problems that surfaced. For example, uncovered in the course of the exercise was a drop in readiness of motor vehicles, which in the event of an actual combat situation would be supplied to district units. I see the cause as lying in an attitude deterioration in the management of motor vehicle organizations and of other enterprises that have shifted to the market economy for the accomplishment of state tasks. Also, the motor vehicle fleet is aging due to a lack of replacement parts. It can become completely inoperative. Also leaving something to be desired is the professional training possessed by a certain number of drivers working for the enterprises.

In a word, "Center" made it possible to evaluate the district's actual capabilities and set goals to work toward, once again based on our capabilities in an environment of personnel shortages.

[Veklich] Viktor Andreyevich, it is a fact that special importance is being attached to troop command and control. What are the prospects for providing the district's command and control elements with modern automation and communication equipment?

[Kopylov] We have devised a plan for improving command and control facilities; its implementation has

already produced tangible results. For example, the PVO [air defense] command and control facility has been completely automated. We have a display system there, and have set up direct communication with the PVO strany [country] command and control facility. Thus, we were able to reduce district PVO command and control and reorganize the cooperation process. By examining the problems of air defense, we see solutions in a unified PVO strany system. A major role should undoubtedly be played by large units of the PVO Voysk [troops] of Russia located in the district's territory. We enjoy good communication with them. We also plan to undertake certain measures related to reorganizing and improving a number of other fixed and field command and control facilities.

[Veklich] How have those persons who are on duty on the basis of contract service contributed toward the maintenance of combat readiness?

[Kopylov] Presently in the district there are about 3,000 servicemen of that kind. The contract arrangement has enabled us to effect a considerable correction in shortages of all categories of drivers. Vehicles are now being operated by professionals, with the result that the number of district motor vehicle accidents has been halved this year. Presently serving in a number of military collectives are entire subunits consisting of "pros." Even this rather limited experiment shows that maximum benefit is derived from service by contractors when they are brought together into a company or battalion. This makes it possible to provide them with more intensive training.

However, I think that there is as yet no firm economic backing to bind the contract serviceman to the Armed Forces. In my opinion, if a person who has signed a contract to serve for three years wishes to receive a discharge after one year, he should be made to pay a penalty.

[Veklich] Viktor Andreyevich, now for the last question. Is it possible that Siberian soldiers may find themselves facing the present obviously difficult Siberian winter without heat in the barracks, while officers' families may not have a roof over their heads?

[Kopylov] I take pleasure in saying that this year commanders of the district's KEU [billing directorate] headed by Colonel Grigoriy Kuyan and rear services officers have done much to prepare all personnel comfort systems for the long Siberian winter. All the district's boiler rooms are in working condition, with reserve boilers installed. There is a six-month supply of fuel. However, it is true that personnel difficulties exist. We are losing qualified rear services specialists to places paying half again to twice as much. That is why this winter we must continue to resort to assigning conscripts to servicing of boiler rooms.

Concerning having a roof over one's head, I wish to point out that we do not have a single case of an officer assigned to a withdrawal unit living out in the open.

Thus, we made 40 apartments available to recently arrived aviators. They will be assigned another several dozen apartments in the near future. That is to say, we act like good hosts to people coming to us from beyond the border, even though the number of our people in need of an apartment exceeds 3,000.

I think that we would be able to resolve the housing problem if there were no difficulties with financing.

POLICY

RF Security Council: View From Inside

94UM0133A Moscow SYN OTECHSTVA in Russian
No 49, Dec 93 p 4

[Interview with Valeriy Leonidovich Manilov, Russian Federation Security Council deputy secretary, by SYN OTECHSTVA correspondent; date, place and occasion not specified; under rubric "Russia's Vital Interests"; photo of Manilov included]

[Text] *As is generally known, the Russian Federation Security Council was formed a little over a year ago to ensure realization of the Russian Federation President's functions in governing, shaping domestic, foreign and military policy in the security area, preserving Russia's state sovereignty, maintaining sociopolitical stability in society, and protecting citizen rights and freedoms. Our readers expressed the desire to learn more details about the status, functions and powers of this constitutional entity established on the basis of the Russian Federation Law "On Security." The conversation with Security Council Deputy Secretary Valeriy Manilov began with a traditional request.*

[SYN OTECHSTVA] Valeriy Leonidovich, we would like to hear explanations from the horse's mouth, as they say.

[Manilov] To put it briefly, the Security Council essentially is a collegial, consultative entity which prepares the President's decisions in the security area.

[SYN OTECHSTVA] You called the council a collegial entity. What is its makeup?

[Manilov] The council presently includes 14 of the state's top officials. Three are permanent members by position: the President, who heads the Security Council; Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Government of Russia; and the Security Council secretary. Among the 11 members appointed by the President are the ministers of Economy, Defense, Security, Internal Affairs, Justice, Ecology and Natural Resources, Health, and Finance; Chairman of Goskomsfederatsii [State Committee of Federation]; and the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. In jointly deciding vital issues for the country under the President's direction, they coordinate and

unite the efforts of ministries, departments, establishments and organizations in developing and implementing policy and strategy and ensuring state, economic, social, defense, information, ecologic and other kinds of security.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] But Security Council sessions probably are preceded by some kind of preparatory work?

[Manilov] Of course, an enormous amount. In the most general terms we are speaking of a comprehensive systems analysis of the development of the domestic and international situation and a forecast of its possible changes. A broad range of scientific, research and information-analysis structures are involved in such an analysis, and the capabilities of ministries, departments, and public organizations are used. It is on such an integrated basis that—let's put it this way—warnings of existing and potential threats to Russia's security are developed and proposals for reacting to them and recommendations for preventing emergency situations, overcoming their consequences, and ensuring stability and law and order in the country are formulated.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] Isn't the former Politburo's "hand" apparent here?

[Manilov] I know that such an analogy, concocted by someone for who knows whose need, begins circulating in the media from time to time. Despite the seeming significance, it is—excuse me for saying so—hollow. Do you know why it is absolutely illegitimate to compare the Security Council with the Politburo? This seems rudimentary, but unfortunately one has to repeat it. The Security Council has a fundamentally different mentality, if one can speak about some kind of mentality at all as applied to the Politburo. The Security Council is a constitutional entity. Its status, functions, and powers are clearly and precisely spelled out by law. And like its staff and its working entities, the interdepartmental commissions, it operates strictly within the framework of the law, on the basis of the statute approved by the President and of other legislative instruments in the security area. Its decisions are formalized by presidential edicts. They are public and open to society to the maximum possible extent. Judge for yourself whether or not substitution, duplication, let alone usurpation of the prerogatives and powers of any authoritative structures whatsoever are possible with this. No. I repeat once again: the Security Council, in which top officials of our state who are personally responsible for organizing its life and activity in the most important directions are represented, synthesizes their political will, their political wisdom, and their professional experience and knowledge into a unified national policy.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] Nevertheless, the Security Council has coordinating and monitoring functions?

[Manilov] This question touches on a very sensitive area, so I would like you to set forth my response to it with extreme precision. First. The Security Council does not engage in executive-administrative activity. As they say,

this is the purview of the government, ministries, committees and departments. Second. The Security Council has no management functions. In accordance with the law, it develops proposals for coordinating the work of executive authorities in the process of implementing decisions made in the security area. Third. Take heed that such coordination is organized not by functions (this is the prerogative of the government), but **by objectives**, i.e., not at an executive level, but at a political level. And this specifically is what ensures strategic coordination of operations and the development and implementation of a unified security policy. Fourth. One other level of coordination is envisaged by legislative instruments. It relates to the development and implementation of federal programs for ensuring Russia's security.

That is how matters stand with coordination. As for monitoring, it is carried out by the Security Council secretary and staff with respect to implementation of Security Council decisions and presidential edicts in security matters.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] In your opinion, what is the important thing in ensuring national security?

[Manilov] Generally speaking, there are no unimportant, secondary directions and spheres here. I would include problems of ensuring economic, defense, ecologic and information security and security in the foreign policy area among the basic, principal ones. Only their agreed upon, coordinated, mutually correlated resolution can be effective. No department can cope with them alone. Take ecologic security. The state of affairs here is assuming a threatening nature in many regions, including Moscow. What kind of air are we breathing? What kind of water are we drinking? Will its reserves suffice for long? What kind of "habitat" are we leaving for our children? Will it be possible to live in it? You can continue the list of questions. They must be answered today. Tomorrow already may be too late. It is the same with public security, for we are speaking essentially about creating conditions for a life that is normal and, I would say, free of fear, and about forming mechanisms for the functioning of a rule-of-law state and a civilian society. And public health protection? Is it really possible to underestimate those enormous, fully real, tangible threats about which demographic statistics of recent time literally shout? Or information security, a concept which we did not employ at all until recently. But we are speaking about something very serious. Take just one facet of the problem—our people's moral and psychological mentality. To what values—aesthetic, moral, historical, military-patriotic, cultural—is it devoted? Is it permissible to substitute for these values, alter them in an offhand way, and break the character of the people? For often the information flows which bring a cult of violence, spiritual impoverishment and primitive sex down on Russians are targeted specifically at this. This is national property which must neither be squandered nor crowded out by something alien and borrowed.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] Is it possible to say at least a few words about defense security?

[Manilov] Today new threats to vital interests of Russia and its allies have come to replace previous ones, which, by the way, still have not been overcome completely. A classification of them is given in the "Basic Provisions of Russian Military Doctrine" developed by the Security Council and adopted in early November. These threats must be parried.

And with all the adherence to the priority of peaceful means, this is impossible to do without the presence of a defense potential adequate to Russia's place and role as a great power in the modern world. Our Armed Forces are the concentrated, realized part of this potential. Their mobility, strength level, outfitting, state of supply, and combat readiness are a national concern. This concern has two principal points of application—material and spiritual. Speaking in a generalized way, the former consists of weapons and the latter is the readiness to defend the homeland. Together they provide defense security.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] Evidently the Security Council staff also is structured taking into account the broad spectrum of council tasks?

[Manilov] You are correct. The structure of the Security Council staff has two main units—information analysis and coordination. They adjust close, daily interworking with federal authorities and management entities and with federation components for analyzing and forecasting the situation development, developing proposals and recommendations in the security area, and preparing and implementing federal programs.

One more unit presently is being created—a system of interdepartmental commissions. These are basic working entities of the Security Council with which the staff operates side by side. There are ten. They are called upon to study and prepare fundamental proposals on security in appropriate spheres, coordinated at the ministerial and departmental level.

The staff now is being formed. It is a complex stage, for, as you know, affairs are organized by humans. The main requirements placed on those who come here to work are professionalism, decency, and dedication to the job of new Russian statehood.

The supertask is to establish a harmonious, hard-working collective and an atmosphere of comradeship and responsibility.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] The Security Council approved the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine." Today this document is the focus of attention of politicians, political scientists, analysts, sociologists and the military here in our country and abroad. What could you say about this document?

[Manilov] First of all, it is a national document. Secondly, it is Russian in spirit and content. Thirdly, it is

realistic. Fourthly, it is timely. Fifthly, it is legal. It would be possible to continue, but it would appear the important thing lies elsewhere, in the fact that by adopting the "Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine" at such a difficult, highly dramatic point in its development, Russia clearly and firmly declared adherence to principles of democracy, humanism, nonuse of force, and nonintervention in affairs of other states; a clear vision of prospects for the country's reform; and a firm resolve to protect its interests, the interests of Russia. Of course, military doctrine is a topic for a separate conversation.

[SYN OTECHESTVA] We hope it will take place. You mentioned Russia's interests. We spoke somehow timidly and diffidently about this previously.

[Manilov] True. Even worse, at times we passed over it in silence altogether. But the fact is, vital Russian interests—above all the country's territorial integrity, sovereignty, economic independence, preservation of natural resources and all national property, and spiritual originality—are on the one hand an objective reality and on the other hand an objective need for normal development of the individual, society and the state. And in this sense—pardon me for the unintended tautology—any system, including a national security system, is vital to that extent to which it meets the Motherland's vital interests.

GROUND TROOPS

Aviation Command/Control in Combined-Arms Operation

94UM0131A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian
No 8, Aug 93 (signed to press 16 Jul 93) pp 24-27

[Article by Lt Col V. Sharnauskas: "Aviation Command and Control in Combined-Arms (Operations)"]

[Text] Army Aviation is rightfully considered the most mobile arm of the Ground Troops and moreover possesses a high fighting strength. In the hands of a skilled commander, it can significantly influence the course of combat operations. The experience of combat and operational training of troops and staffs indicates that due to low effectiveness of command and control, in most cases its capabilities are only half realized.

By command and control we mean the purposeful activities of commanders and staffs to maintain combat readiness of aviation units (subunits) of the Ground Troops, preparing them for a battle (operation), and leading them when performing assigned missions. Its organizational and technical basis is a command and control system which today is viewed as a command and control subsystem of the Ground Troops. A close analysis makes it possible to talk about the existence of serious problems in the structural and functional configuration of command and control bodies and facilities if Ground Troops aviation does not conform their capabilities to modern conditions.

For example, in questions of efficiency and quality of command and control, requirements today are being satisfied at less than two-thirds the optimal level.

In our view, this situation is largely explained by the fact that at the front-regiment echelon, two independent systems of control posts exist to this day: Ground Troops aviation and Front Air Army [FAA] aviation. Elements of the first are: In the front—front aviation command posts [KP]; in army-level formations—army command posts. Each includes tactical control groups [TCG], a vectoring and target designation post [VTDP], and a forward air controller control post [FAC CP]. It should be emphasized that **the control posts of Ground Troops aviation are a component part of command posts of combined-arms formations.** Command and control of frontal aviation large units and units is accomplished, as before, through the FAA KP and the FAA tactical control center [TCC], which today also include their own VTDP, TCG, and FAC.

Thus, the timeliness of receiving (transmitting) information is decreased, and it is more difficult to organize and maintain coordination not only between air components but also with ground units. What is more, centralized planning of combat employment of aviation is disrupted.

The second problem I would like to touch upon is equally timely and concerns equipping control posts of Ground Troops aviation with communications and automation equipment. Unfortunately, the existing equipment does not provide the necessary efficiency, and the capabilities for processing, storing, and transmitting information to interested echelons are insufficient. There is virtually no system of information and operational-tactical computational tasks.

Thus, communications equipment at the army-division echelon provides high speed in the telegraph and telecode mode at 50-75 bits per second, time stability, and information reliability of $10^{-2} \dots 10^{-3}$. Is it not a paradox that at the regiment-battalion level, the **forward air controller is deprived of equipment for communications with combined-arms subunits**, precisely in whose interests aviation is performing missions!

The radio allocated to the forward air control for communicating with helicopters (aircraft) has a limited operating range and is not resistant to jamming. This fact makes it extremely difficult to organize coordination of aviation with ground units (subunits) and does not meet the requirements of security of joint combat operations.

The situation is no better with command and control bodies and facilities being equipped with automation equipment. The "Manevr" automated command and control system (front-regiment) includes only the aviation combat control group MP-23 command and staff vehicle; other levels of the Ground Troops command and control system do not have them.

Unclear differentiation of the functions of command and control bodies and facilities of Ground Troops

aviation and front air army aviation, and incomplete definition of the duties of control post officials in organizing combat employment of aviation and command and control of it during an operation (combat), also have a negative effect on aviation command and control.

Incidentally, similar problems also had to be solved by U.S. Army command authorities in the early 1980's when army aviation was made an independent combat arm. Over the course of several years, three interrelated levels were created in the U.S. Army Aviation command and control system: Command, coordination of operations in the airspace, and air traffic control. The Army Corps [AC] Combat Operations Control Center [COCC] has army aviation squads from the operations office of the corps headquarters and an airspace operations coordination team. The division COCC includes an airspace operations coordination group [AOCG]. Combat support groups (which organize coordination with army aviation) and a brigade staff aviation officer, coordinating operations in the airspace over the combat operations area, are located at the brigade command post. The coordination group is formed when the antitank helicopter battalion is transferred to the operational subordination of the combined-arms brigade. At the battalion's command post are a fire support coordination officer and a staff representative of the motorized rifle battalion (tank battalion).


The composition of the COCC and AOCG includes an air defense officer, tactical and army aviation officers, a field artillery officer, an electronic warfare [EW] officer, an air traffic control officer, and also support personnel, who all together participate in organizing and accomplishing coordination.

To increase the effectiveness of command and control, army aviation created its own ATMAT automated control system (similar to the 485L tactical aviation automated control system).

In the future it is planned to equip tactical and army aviation aircraft and helicopters with a new system for determining the location of troops, installations, and communications—the PLRS/JTIDS, which will enable airborne objects to determine their location with an accuracy of up to 25 meters and to exchange information in the data transmission mode using the automated control system. (There is virtually continuous coordination with the control post of the Ground Troops and even with individual objects—tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, surface-to-air missile systems, self-propelled antiaircraft guns, infantry fighting vehicles, and so forth).

It seems that it is also time for our army aviation to determine the directions of improving the command and control system. These directions are seen as conducting a set of measures of a military scientific, technical, and structural nature aimed primarily at increasing the functioning effectiveness of the aviation control post system of the Ground Troops.

Structural Model of Proposed System of Aviation Control Posts



In the author's opinion, it is necessary to reorganize the system of command and control bodies and aviation control posts of the Ground Troops. In particular, it makes sense to make wider use of the modular principle of building the control posts. The primary module in a motorized rifle (tank) regiment may be an aviation control team [ACT] made up of 4-5 people (ACT chief; coordination officer; officer for collection, processing, and analysis of information on the air and ground situation; and 1-2 guidance and target designation officers).

In a division (brigade) it is desirable to create an aviation control group [ACG] of 18-20 people. Several independent groups can be assigned from it, each of which would include a position for a tactical control officer [TCO] of the front air army operations group. The ACG must be equipped with a radar with an operating range of up to 40 km.

In a combined-arms formation (army corps, army) it is advisable to have an aviation control center [ACC] with 30-36 people, in which a front air army operations group [OG] also works.

For increasing the timeliness and quality of aviation command and control, closer coordination with Ground Troops units, and centralized command and control of weapons of the combat arms, it is necessary to locate all the above aviation command and control bodies together with the

control posts of the missile troops and artillery, air defense, and electronic combat. It is also necessary to form a main Combat Operations Control Center [MCOCC] at a front, a Combat Operations Control Center [COCC] at a combined-arms (tank) army, a Combat Operations Control Group [COCG] at a division (brigade), and a Combat Operations Control Team [COCT] at a regiment. A structural model of the proposed system of aviation control posts is shown in the diagram.

Aviation tactical control complexes [ATCC] can make a significant contribution to increasing the effectiveness of command and control of aviation in a battle and operation. Equipping them with advanced communications and data transmission equipment will ensure complete technical compatibility of the ATCC with aviation ground control posts of the Ground Troops deployed on the base of the "Manevr" automated command and control system and its effective use in the interests of both organic and supporting aviation.

In addition, for vectoring helicopters to ground and airborne targets, it makes sense to install a special radar on the ATCC's, which would provide an information field for command and control of combat formations of Ground Troops aviation in the zone of operations of the combined-arms formation. Use of the ATCC could ensure not only

detection of enemy offensive air weapons but also reconnaissance of moving ground targets.

Practical implementation of the proposals outlined above, in the author's opinion, would make it possible to reach a modern level of command and control of Ground Troops aviation and would ensure maximum realization of the combat capabilities of units and subunits.

In conclusion, let us emphasize this thought. In our time, command and control, including of forces and assets of Ground Troops aviation, is becoming perhaps just as important a factor of success as the number of troops (forces) and weapons, and the correlation of command and control capabilities of the opposing sides often decides the outcome of a battle.

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NAVAL FORCES

Current State of Black Sea Fleet Conflict

94UM0127B Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 44, 31 Oct 93 p 7b

[Article by military commentator Aleksandr Zhilin: "Investigation"; "Black Sea Fleet: Actors and Prompters"]

[Text] The political crisis that has shaken Russia and Ukraine has somewhat dampened the dispute over the future of the Black Sea Fleet. But as the presidents deal with their parliaments, it seems that "third forces" have joined the struggle for the Black Sea Fleet.

The two presidents' agreements on the Black Sea Fleet have a strange quality: It has become clear with time that each side has its own understanding of the accord that was reached. After the September meeting at Massandra, where "appropriate documents" were signed, it was said, Boris Yeltsin hastened to declare that Ukraine was turning its part of the Black Sea Fleet over to Russia as payment for accumulated debts. However, Leonid Kravchuk unexpectedly declared that he had signed no documents on the Black Sea Fleet and considered any bargaining to be inappropriate altogether.

Such clashes on the political stage do not arise by accident. When the main actors, waving goodbye to the agreed-upon scenario, begin to improvise, it is not hard to guess that each is trying to please his own "audience." And if the situation starts to become awkward, it is best to leave the game for a time.

Interests

The problems associated with the Black Sea Fleet have now been taken up by state delegations. Their mandates and responsibilities are unclear, since the presidents never agreed on explicit criteria for dividing the Fleet. Nevertheless, certain progress has been made in efforts to solve the problem.

On 29-30 September in Moscow, the Russian side insisted on drafting an agreement under which the entire Black Sea Fleet would be used by Russia. At the same time, Russia expects to acquire the part of the Fleet that, under the previous accords, was supposed to pass to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian delegation proposed its own solution: Russia would lease individual Fleet installations, pay compensation to Ukraine for environmental damages caused by the Black Sea Fleet's activities, and foot the bill for developing the social and economic infrastructure. In addition, Ukraine would like to maintain joint command of the Black Sea Fleet, while Russia would bear virtually the entire burden of financing and supplying the Fleet.

The latest round of talks was held on 13 October in Kiev. Russia did not alter its terms. Ukraine made concessions: It agreed to set up working groups that would devise an agreement under which Russia would use the entire Black Sea Fleet. This could be a mere tactical move designed to allow the Ukrainian side to gain time. In any case, this is the view of several experts, who point out that as the political delegations debate, the military and intelligence services are beginning to step up their activities.

Behind the Scenes

Strictly speaking, the Ukrainian Security Service and Ministry of Defense have never been passive observers in the debate over the Black Sea Fleet. According to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's information, the Ukrainian Security Service has repeatedly informed Kravchuk of possible "provocations" in Sevastopol being organized by Russian intelligence services. In response, Lyubanka has been forced to issue a denial to the Ukrainian president and to assure him that it is not interfering in the Crimean conflict. In order to avoid unnecessary complications, the Russian Ministry of Security has even agreed that in the Black Sea Fleet military units under Russian jurisdiction, the special departments (military counterintelligence) could be Ukrainian; in other words, that could belong to the other state. This is unprecedented, since counterintelligence officers control classified information, attend all official conferences, have their own informers in subunits, and so forth.

Until recently, military counterintelligence in the Ukrainian Security Service was headed by General Aleksandr Skipalskiy, a notorious figure in chekist circles. In 1982-1984, while serving as deputy chief of the military counterintelligence department of the Pacific Border District, he became so preoccupied with "informal activity" that Japanese smugglers began to classify him as a "window-bureaucrat"—their name for officials through whom they could smuggle contraband. His Moscow patrons were able to protect him from major unpleasanties by sending him to serve in the Transbaykal region.

The exile ended in 1987, and Skipalskiy was "redeployed" to Ukraine as deputy chief of the army military counterintelligence department. He befriended Vasilii Durdinets, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, and soon became his deputy. When Durdinets was

elected first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, he installed Skypalskiy as chief of the Ukrainian Security Service's military counterintelligence division.

Working hard to justify his high appointment, Skypalskiy actively exposed "subversive activities" by Russian intelligence services in Ukraine. In 1992, through Durdinets, Leonid Kravchuk received Skypalskiy's first report to the effect that the Russian Chief Intelligence Administration was "preparing measures to activate intelligence groups in the Black Sea Fleet and special reserve intelligence agents and reactivating secret caches of weapons and radio equipment in the Crimea for actions against Ukraine." Under this pretext, the Ukrainian Security Service dispatched sizable forces and equipment to the region "to step up counterintelligence." Skypalskiy was soon promoted to general.

Documents

To assume that Russian intelligence services are as innocent as a child would be to question their professionalism. But the Ukrainian Security Service wasn't born yesterday either. Documents in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's possession indicate that Ukrainian intelligence is devoting considerable attention to the Crimea.

A closed collegial meeting was held in the state administration building in Sevastopol on 27 July. It was attended by Kuntsevskiy, the Ukrainian Security Service's chief for the Crimea and Sevastopol; Rear Admiral Obishchenko, chief of the military counterintelligence administration; and Cherniy, chief of the counterintelligence administration. They approved a plan of measures that merits detailed quotation. It calls for:

1. *The establishment in the city of Sevastopol of a coordinating council for work in pro-Russian structures, to include officials of the military and territorial counterintelligence administrations. Major-General Cherniy and Yermakov (the president's representative) will be charged with immediate supervision of the council. The council's activities will be overseen by Mr. Marchuk (chief of the Ukrainian Security Service—A. Zh.), who will report on the council's work to the Ukrainian president.*

2. *In order to exert active pressure on pro-Russian structures in Sevastopol and to encourage the initiative of Ukrainian patriotic forces in the Crimea, to hold a general plenary meeting of Ukrainian structures by 15 August, to begin forming resistance columns. Groups of Ukrainians displaying national symbols are to put up resistance to demonstrations by the Russian population of Sevastopol, in order to create the impression of a struggle against an occupation regime. The responsible officials are Mr. Obishchenko and Mr. Kuntsevskiy. The operation will be overseen by Mr. Cherniy.*

3. *In carrying out day to day efforts to discredit Russian structures in Sevastopol and in the Crimea as a whole, especially during rallies and demonstrations, fighting groups consisting of UNSO-UPA [Ukrainian People's Self-Defense] members are to be set up in the resistance columns. Their mission will be to end a state of calm at*

such demonstrations and meetings. It is especially advisable to carry out actions with respect to specific individuals (activists), and to assign responsibility for possible consequences on Moscow forces. In order to carry out this decision, a group of 150 reliable UNSO-UPA fighters are to be sent from Kiev prior to 1 September. Mr. Obishchenko will be charged with framing the mission and providing accommodations for and working with the UNSO-UPA fighters.

4. *To direct the mass media to organize a systematic effort to discredit Russian policy in the Crimea and in the nearby foreign countries. This work will be organized by Yermakov and Generak Cherniy.*

5. *To set up close surveillance of leaders of pro-Russian structures and members of the Black Sea Fleet Military Council.*

Motives

Who needs such questionable actions, and why?

"Ukraine's political and military leaders know that if they unable to obtain a sizable sum for the Black Sea Fleet from Russia and at the same time maintain joint command as a formal sign of Ukrainian ownership of part of the Fleet, they will have to get rid of the latter at any price. The current financial and material-technical state of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense allows it to maintain, to at least some extent, a maximum of 25 percent of the republic's total armed forces. Things are so bad in our republic that the collapsing Army is simply starting to pose a danger to society," an officer of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense central staff told a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent.

In his opinion, if efforts to bargain for as much as possible from Russia fail, there will be just one alternative: To create a situation in the Crimea such that the presence of Russian sailors there will become impossible in both political and moral-psychological terms. Then the "humiliated and insulted" crews of Russian ships, raising the Andreyevskiy flags, will go home on their own.

Intrigues

The actions of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry fit into this scenario quite well. Former Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov issued a number of orders aimed at seizing individual units and installations of the Black Sea Fleet. As a result, a major conflict was provoked when ship commanders raised the Andreyevskiy flags and were prepared to issue an ultimatum to officials of both countries.

After the presidents' Massandra meeting, a new scandal broke out in Sevastopol. Rumors swept the city that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Navy were planning a provocation aimed at "torpedoing the latest agreements on the Black Sea Fleet."

According to confidential information from the central staff of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the plan was as follows. A "political-criminal incident" would be provoked in the

Sevastopol garrison—with casualties, if possible. This would create a compelling pretext to impose a state of emergency in Sevastopol. The sailors' response would be clear. The Andreyevskiy flag would be raised on Black Sea Fleet warships. Then Ukraine would accuse Russia of scuttling the accords and demand the immediate withdrawal of the "mutinous" ships of a foreign power from its territory.

Unlike the Security Service's "plan of measures," this project was not put down on paper. It exists only in recordings of telephone conversations between high-ranking military officials. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense denies these reports. However, the facts lead one to suspect that rumors of impending provocations are not groundless. The attacks on Russian units by Ukrainian naval infantrymen, the arrival of additional Ukrainian "Berkut" special units in Sevastopol, the sending of armored equipment and weapons to the city, including flame-throwers, which are designed for combat operations in residential quarters, not at sea, and so on—this chain of events can hardly be seen as a string of random events. And the hasty removal of Defense Ministry Konstantin Morozov and Ukrainian Naval Commander Boris Kozhin from their posts and the transfer of Ukrainian Security Service counterintelligence chief Aleksandr Skipalskiy to a new post tend to support this view.

The official explanations for the resignations are different, needless to say. However, observers think that in reality the personnel shuffles stem from the fact that the "Morozov-Kozhin-Skipalskiy" triumvirate had tried to play an independent role in the Crimean region. In addition, experts call attention to General Morozov's desire to establish close ties with Ukrainian nationalist forces behind the president's back and to assume the role of "savior of the republic's sovereignty and national interests."

Outlook

The personnel of the Black Sea Fleet are tired of constant scandals, provocations, and uncertainty. Speaking at a session of the Military Council, the Black Sea Fleet Commander, Admiral Eduard Baltin, said bitterly that young officers are leaving military service. Twenty-two lieutenants who graduated from schools have refused to serve in the Fleet this year alone.

According to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's information, officers who have five or six more years before retirement do not intend to leave. But they are also unwilling to remain hostage to political ambitions. The question of whether to issue a stern ultimatum to Yeltsin and Kravchuk and to force the two countries' leaders to finally solve the problem of the Fleet is being discussed once more. This is a dangerous symptom, because the Black Sea Fleet has enough military power to draw the presidents' attention. On the other hand, Yeltsin and Kravchuk have utterly exhausted the sailors' confidence, and this is greatly fueling aggressive sentiments among the latter. If another "ship mutiny" occurs, Eduard Baltin will hardly be able to neutralize it the way he did the last time. The commander, who has himself become a hostage to the political game, will have no more arguments.

The protracted Black Sea performance changes genres from one act to the next: From a comedy, to a drama—to a tragedy?

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Dossier: As of October 15, 1993, the Black Sea Fleet had received a total of 89,277.7 million karbovantsy in credits, including 67,410.7 million karbovantsy from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (75.5 percent of the total), and 21,867.0 million karbovantsy from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (24.5 percent).

The provision of credits to the Fleet by Ukraine has declined in recent months. The Ukraine's share of Black Sea Fleet financing stood at 8.7 percent in August, 6.8 percent in September, and 0 in October.

The Black Sea Fleet is incurring considerable expenses in maintaining Ukrainian military units. In the first nine months of this year, 26 Ukrainian military units were given free food products valued at 2,668.0 million karbovantsy. The pay for compulsory-duty servicemen conscripted from Ukrainian territory and serving in the Black Sea Fleet under oath to Ukraine totals almost 500.0 million karbovantsy each month.

The Black Sea Fleet has appropriated 12,169.7 million karbovantsy for construction of housing and social, cultural, and consumer-service facilities (including fuel provided to the construction administration), while the Ukrainian Navy has appropriated 5,965.0 million karbovantsy.

The cost of maintaining the Fleet is increased by amounts levied by the Ukrainian tax and customs inspectorates. The land tax, including an upcoming payment for the second half of the year, will amount to almost 13,000.0 million karbovantsy. Customs duties on equipment and supplies imported for the Fleet amounted to 39,053.6 thousand karbovantsy, including 9,941 thousand karbovantsy for food, 5,000.0 thousand karbovantsy for various supplies, 23,289.3 thousand karbovantsy for fuel, and 823.3 thousand karbovantsy for motor vehicles. The quarantine inspectorate has charged 3,740.0 thousand karbovantsy to inspect imported food products. Officers and naval warrant officers arriving from Russia are charged 300.0 thousand karbovantsy for customs inspection of each container of belongings.

The Fleet has paid 13,900.0 thousand karbovantsy in various road fees, and 6,300.0 thousand karbovantsy for railroad services.

The naval engineering service has spent 9,900.0 thousand and 4,500.0 thousand karbovantsy to maintain Ukrainian motor roads and railways, respectively.

A \$10 fee (or an equivalent sum in karbovantsy at the bank exchange rate) is charged for each flight by airplanes from Russian territory to the Black Sea Fleet. Five

dollars are charged for each customs officer who comes to inspect an airplane, and that amount is doubled on weekends and holidays.

In addition, there are a number of other, smaller duties and payments that are impossible to tally. (From a report by the chief of the Black Sea Fleet financial service.)

Crew List from Submarine K-129 (Cont)

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[Unattributed article: "Crew List of Submarine K-129; Conclusion. Beginning Published in Issues for 13 November and 4 December 1993"]

[Text]

Crew List of Submarine K-129

No.	Position	Name and Rank	Year of Birth/Year Entered Navy	Nationality	Place of Induction, Family and Address (at time of submarine loss)
41	Engine room officer	Senior Seaman Yuriy Ivanovich Telnov	1946/1965	Russian	Borzinsk Rayon Military Commissariat (RVK), Chita Oblast, mother Matrena Ivanovna Kulobukhova and brother, Zabaykalsk Station, Chita Oblast
42	Engine-room officer	Petty Officer 2d Class Petr Ivanovich Gouge	1946/1965	Russian	Blagoveshchensk RVK, Amur Oblast, stepfather Yakov Dmitriyevich Hibe, mother Yekaterina Petrovna, Khabarovskiy Kray, Rayon imeni Lazo, Siga Settlement, Ussuriyskaya Ulitsa, 2
43	Engine-room officer	Petty Officer 2d Class Viktor Dmitriyevich Plyuspin	1945/1964	Russian	Solikamsk RVK, Perm Oblast, wife Yelizaveta Aleksandrova Plyuspina, father Dmitriy Pavlovich Plyuspin, stepmother Mariya Ivanovna Bogdanova, brother, Perm Oblast, Krasnovishchensk Rayon, Ust-Uzh
44	Senior leading stoker	Senior Seaman Mikhail Vladimirovich Zverev	1945/1964	Russian	Aleksandrovsk RVK, Perm Oblast, mother Nadezhda Yakovlevna Zvereva, Perm Oblast, Yayva, Ulitsa Energetikov, 60
45	Engine-room officer	Petty Officer 1st Class Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Shpak	1945/1964	Russian	Bakhchinsk RVK, Tomsk Oblast, mother Lidiya Moiseyevna Shpak, Tuapse, Ulitsa Pushkina, 6, Apt 1
46	Senior leading stoker	Seaman Yuriy Vasilyevich Shishkin	1946/1965	Russian	Nakhodka RVK, Primorskiy Kray, sister Galina Vasilyevna Dulchenko; Nakhodka, Ulitsa 44, District 8, Apt 17
47	Machinist	Seaman Aleksandr Sergeyevich Vasilyev	1944/1966	Russian	Skovorodino RVK, Amur Oblast, mother Klavdiya Kuzminichna Vasilyeva; Skovorodino, Nagornaya, 22
48	Machinist	Seaman Sergey Vladimirovich Osipov	1947/1966	Russian	Traktorzavodskiy RVK, Chelyabinsk, mother Klavdiya Georgiyevna Osipova, sister, Chelyabinsk, Ulitsa Kultury, 106, Apt 7
49	Machinist	Seaman Gennadiy Ivanovich Kravtsov	1947/1966	Russian	Kirov RVK, Novosibirsk Oblast, father Ivan Pavlovich Kravtsov, mother Mariya Vasilyevna Kravtsova, two sisters, Novosibirsk Oblast, Chulym Rayon, Kokoshino Station
50	Machinist	Seaman Nikolay Andreyevich Redkosheyev	1948/1967	Russian	Pervomayskiy RVK, Vladivostok, father Andrey Mikhaylovich Redkosheyev, mother Mariya Demyanovna, brother, two sisters, Chelyabinsk, Ulitsa Gertsya, 16, Apt 16
51	Machinist	Seaman Anatoliy Semenovich Kabakov	1948/1967	Russian	Zaigraev RVK, Buryat ASSR, father Semen Guryanovich Kabakov, mother Zinaida Fedoseyevna Kabakova, brother, Uregetey, Zpigrayev Rayon, Buryat ASSR
52	Machinist	Seaman Ivan Ivanovich Odintsev	1947/1966	Russian	Yenisey RVK, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, father Ivan Yefimovich Odintsev, mother Zinaida Pavlovna, Lebedevka, Yenisey Rayon, Krasnoyarskiy Kray
53	Machinist	Seaman Vladimir Valentinovich Kolbin	1948/1967	Russian	Aleksandrovsk RVK, Sakhalin Oblast, father Valentin Demyanovich Kolbin, mother Yekaterina Dmitriyevna, brother, Sakhalin Oblast, Mgachi, Lessad, 16

Crew List of Submarine K-129 (Continued)

No.	Position	Name and Rank	Year of Birth/Year Entered Navy	Nationality	Place of Induction, Family and Address (at time of submarine loss)
54	Machinist	Seaman Anatoliy Ivanovich Rudnik	1948/1967	Russian	Shkotovo RVK, Primorsky Krai, father Ivan Yakovlevich Rudnik, mother Mariya Ivanovna, sister, three brothers, Primorsky Krai, Kirov Rayon, Podgornoye
55	Electrician's mate	Warrant Officer (extended service) Ivan Tikhonovich Kotov	1939/1959	Russian	Taganrog RVK, Rostov Oblast, wife Alda Nikolayevna Kotova, Taganrog, Northern Settlement, Second Line, 177
56	Electrical room officer	Petty Officer 2d Class Nikolay Nikolayevich Bazhenov	1945/1964	Udmurt	Glazov RVK, Udmurt ASSR, father Nikolay Nikitovich Bazhenov, mother Agrippina Ivanovna Bazhenova, three sisters, brother, Udmurt ASSR, Glazov Rayon, Badzymshur
57	Electrical room officer	Chief Petty Officer (extended service) Nikolay Dmitriyevich Abramov	1945/1964	Russian	Nevskiy RVK, Leningrad, mother Vera Aleksandrovna Abramova, Leningrad, Ulitsa Bauman, Bldg 9, Apt 7
58	Electrical room officer	Senior Seaman Vladimir Grigoriyevich Oshepkov	1946/1965	Russian	Dzerzhinskiy RVK, Perm, father Grigoriy Alekseyevich Oshepkov, mother Mariya Alekseyevna, Perm Rayon, N. Ilnsk
59	Chief electrician	Seaman Vladimir Alekseyev Pogodayev	1946/1965	Russian	Ordzhonikidze RVK, Sverdlovsk Oblast, father Aleksey Ivanovich Pogodayev, mother Anna Ivanovna Pogodayeva, Sverdlovsk, Ulitsa Krasnykh Kommunarov, 80, Apt 1
60	Chief electrician	Seaman Leonid Konstantinovich Bozhenko	1945/1964	Russian	Kargat RVK, Novosibirsk Oblast, father Konstantin Antonovich Bozhenko, mother Vera Vasilyevna Bozhenko, brother, Novosibirsk Oblast, Kargat, Ulitsa Sovetskaya, 3, Apt 3
61	Chief electrician	Seaman Ivan Aleksandrovich Dasko	1947/1966	Russian	Chany RVK, Novosibirsk Oblast, mother Anna Grigoryevna, stepfather Andrey Aleksandrovich Dering, sister, two brothers, Novosibirsk Oblast, Bolotnoye Rayon, Kornilovo
62	Electrician	Seaman Aleksandr Nikiforovich Ozhima	1947/1966	Russian	Oktyabrskiy RVK, Omsk, father Nikifor Pavlovich Ozhima, mother Anna Fedorovna Ozhima, brother, two sisters, Omsk, Ulitsa 8-aya Rabochaya, 20
63	Electrician	Seaman Vladimir Matveyevich Gostev	1946/1966	Russian	Chany RVK, Novosibirsk Oblast, mother Yefrosinya Leontyeva Gosteva, sister, two brothers, Novosibirsk Oblast, Chany Rayon, Chanovskiy Sovkhoz, Bldg 3
64	Electrician	Seaman Boris Petrovich Torsunov	1948/1967	Russian	Satka RVK, Chelyabinsk Oblast, mother Duklida Stepanovna Torsunova, brother, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Satka, Ulitsa Professionalnaya, 70
65	Electrician	Seaman Aleksandr Nikolayevich Toshchevnikov	1947/1966	Russian	Perm RVK, Perm Oblast, father Nikolay Tikhonovich Toshchevnikov, mother Vera Ivanovna Toshchevnikova, Yugo-Kamskiy Settlement, Perm Oblast
66	Electrician	Seaman Anatoliy Afanasyevich Dyagtyarev	1947/1966	Russian	Krasnoarmeysk RVK, Chelyabinsk Oblast, stepfather Anatoliy Ivanovich Demidov, mother Mariya Pavlovna Demidova, brother, three sisters, Shabaltakh, Krasnoarmeysk Rayon, Chelyabinsk Oblast
67	Electrician	Seaman Vladimir Vasilyevich Sokolov	1947/1966	Russian	N-Turinsk RVK, Sverdlovsk Oblast, father Vasily Pavlovich Sokolov, mother Yevdokiya Yakovlevich Sokolova, brother, Valeryanovsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Ulitsa Pervomayskaya, 23
68	Engine-room petty officer	Chief Petty Officer (extended service) Valentin Pavlovich Ivanov	1944/1963	Russian	Oktyabrskiy RVK, Novosibirsk, mother Anastasiya Yegorovna Ivanova, Novosibirsk, Ulitsa Dekabristov, 4, Apt 9

Crew List of Submarine K-129 (Continued)

No.	Position	Name and Rank	Year of Birth/Year Entered Navy	Nationality	Place of Induction, Family and Address (at time of submarine loss)
69	Engine-room officer	Petty Officer 2d Class Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Polyanskiy	1946/1965	Russian	Kamensk-Uralskiy City Military Commissariat [GVK], Sverdlovsk Oblast, mother Aksinya Yefimovna Polyanskaya, sister, Kamensk-Uralskiy, Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 54, Apt 38
70	Engine-room officer	Petty Officer 2d Class Mikhail Seliverstovich Savitskiy	1945/1964	Russian	Tavda RVK, Sverdlovsk Oblast, mother Agrafena Nikolayevna Myaskova, Chem Settlement, Tavda Raion, Sverdlovsk Oblast
71	Senior engine-room man	Senior Seaman Gennadiy Innokentiyevich Kobelev	1947/1966	Russian	Slyudyanka RVK, Irkutsk Oblast, mother Matrena Arkhipovna Kobeleva, three brothers, two sisters, Akhalik, Tunkinskiy Rayon, BASSR
72	Senior engine-room man	Senior Seaman Vladimir Mikhaylovich Sorokin	1945/1964	Russian	Kemerovo Oblast, Myski RVK, mother Yekaterina Antonovna Benener, stepfather Yefim Petrovich Lauman, Myski, Pritomskiy Quarter, 3, Apt 5
73	Senior engine-room man	Seaman Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Peskov	1947/1966	Russian	Kotelnich RVK, Kirov Oblast, father Konstantin Gavrilovich Peskov, mother, sister, Bysk, Urzhum Rayon, Kirov Oblast
74	Engine-room man	Seaman Aleksandr Ivanovich Yarygin	1945/1964	Russian	N-Turinsk RVK, Sverdlovsk Oblast, father Ivan Ivanovich Yarygin, mother Aleksandra Dmitriyevna Yargina, Turinsk, Ulitsa Sovetskaya, 63
75	Engine-room man	Seaman Aleksandr Stepanovich Kryuchkov	1947/1966	Russian	Bodaybo RVK, Irkutsk Oblast, father Stepan Yegorovich Kryuchkov, mother Irada Grigoryevna Kryuchkova, three brothers, sister, Bodaybo, Aprelskiy Pereulok
76	Engine-room man	Seaman Vladimir Nikolayevich Polyakov	1948/1967	Russian	Shalya RVK, Sverdlovsk Oblast, father Nikolay Kuzmich Polyakov, mother Yekaterina Ivanovna Polyakova, Shamary, Shalya Rayon, Ulitsa Kalinina, 34
77	Radiotechnical crew officer	Warrant Officer (extended service) Vladimir Yulianovich Sprishevskiy	1934/1953	Russian	Wife Zinaida Mikhaylovna Sprishevskaya, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Rybachiy, Ulitsa Nakhimova, 41, Apt 5
78	Sonar officer	Senior Seaman Aleksandr Petrovich Kulikov	1947/1966	Russian	Golyshmanovo RVK, Tyumen Oblast, mother Tatyana Fedorovna Kulikova, Sorochkan, Tyumen Oblast
79	Senior sonarman	Seaman Viktor Aleksandrovich Likhov	1947/1966	Russian	Cheremkhovo RVK, Irkutsk Oblast, father Aleksandr Trofimovich Likhov, mother Marta Likhova, brother, three sisters, Yelan, Belskiy Rural Soviet, Cheremkhovo Rayon
80	Senior sonarman	Seaman Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Pichurin	1968/1967	Russian	Nizhne-Ingashskiy RVK, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, father Aleksandr Ivanovich Pichurin, brother, sister, Tinskaya, Nizhne-Ingashskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarskiy Kray
81	Radiometer Officer	Senior Seaman Anatoliy Sergeyevich Naymushin	1947/1966	Russian	Votkinsk RVK, Udmurt ASSR, father Sergey Fedorovich Naymushin, mother Faina Nikiforovna Naymushina, Votkinsk, Ulitsa Gorkogo, 65
82	Senior Radiometer operator	Seaman Nikolay Dmitriyevich Koshkarev	1947/1966	Russian	Votkinsk RVK, Udmurt ASSR, father Dmitriy Pavlovich Koshkarev, mother Mariya Nikolayevna, two brothers, two sisters, Votkinsk, Ulitsa Azina, 23
83	Radiometer operator	Seaman Oleg Vladimirovich Zubarev	1947/1966	Russian	Oktyabrskiy RVK, Krasnoyarsk, father Vladimir Mikhaylovich Zubarev, mother Mariya Ivanovna, sister, Kansk, Ulitsa 40 let Oktyabrya, 64, Apt 9

Crew List of Submarine K-129 (Continued)

No.	Position	Name and Rank	Year of Birth/Year Entered Navy	Nationality	Place of Induction, Family and Address (at time of submarine loss)
84	CW orderly	Petty Officer 2d Class Valeriy Mikhaylovich Bakhirev	1946/1965	Russian	Uzhur RVK, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, father Mikhail Petrovich Bakhirev, mother Vera Andreyevna, two brothers, Uzhur, Ulitsa Prosveshcheniya, 3
85	Chief cook instructor	Chief Petty Officer (extended service) Viktor Mikhaylovich Labzin	1941/1960	Russian	Sovetskiy RVK, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, mother Lyubov Alekseyevna Labzina; Gorkiy Oblast, Arzamas Rayon, Knyazevka
86	Chief cook	Senior Seaman Leonid Vladimirovich Matantsev	1946/1965	Russian	Kirovo-Chepetsk RVK, Kirov Oblast, father Vladimir Dmitriyevich Matantsev, stepmother Yuliya Vasilyevna Matantseva, two brothers, two sisters, Kirov Oblast, N-Veshok, Ulitsa Khalturina, 12
87	Chief cook	Seaman Gennadiy Viktorovich Chernitsa	1946/1965	Russian	Central RVK, Novokuznetsk, father Viktor Grigoryevich Chernitsa, mother Natalya Spiridonovna Chernitsa, sister, Abagur, Zemnukhova, 28, Apt 5
88	Radiometer operator instructor	Petty Officer 2d Class Aleksandr Ivanovich Kuchinskiy	1946/1965	Belorussian	Dzhezkazgan RVK, Karaganda Oblast, father Ivan Aleksandrovich Kuchinskiy, mother Anna Ivanovna Kuchinskaya, two brothers, sister, Gomel Oblast, Petrikov Rayon, Belyy Pereyezd
89	Radio telegraph officer	Petty Officer 1st Class Aleksandr Vladimirovich Khvatov	1945/1964	Russian	Vladimir GVK, Vladimir Oblast, father Vladimir Aleksandrovich Khvatov, mother Klavdiya Ivanovna Khvatova; Vladimir, Ulitsa Frunze, 1-a, Apt 26
90	Radio telegraph officer	Petty Officer 2d Class Anatoliy Semenovich Chichkanov	1946/1965	Russian	Tambov RVK, Tambov Oblast, father Semen Yemelyanovich Chichkanov, mother Tatyana Pavlovna, two brothers, five sisters, Tambov Oblast, Tambov Rayon, Donskoye
91	Radio telegraphist	Seaman Vladimir Vasilyevich Kozin	1947/1966	Russian	Kholmsk RVK, Sakhalin Oblast, father Vasily Ivanovich Kozin, Sakhalin Oblast, Kholmsk Rayon, Pushkino, Kolkhoznaya, 62
92	Radio telegraphist	Seaman Oleg Leonidovich Kruchinin	1947/1966	Russian	Motovilikhinskiy RVK, Perm, father Leonid Andreyevich Kruchinin, mother Sofia Nikolayevna Kruchinina; Perm, 15, District 23, Apt 7
93	Apprentice radio telegraphist	Seaman Vladimir Mikhaylovich Plaksa	1947/1967	Russian	Azov RVK, Rostov Oblast, father Mikhail Grigoryevich Plaksa; Azov, Ulitsa Sportivnaya, 28, Apt 4
94	Navigation electrical officer	Senior Seaman Timur Tarkhayevich Mikhaylov	1947/1966	Buryat	Angarsk GVK, Irkutsk Oblast, father Tarkhay Tarasovich Mikhaylov, mother Ulyana Lavrentyevna Gavrilova, two brothers, sister, Irkutsk Oblast, Angarsk Rayon, Ular-Khuan
95	Sonar officer	Senior Seaman Aleksey Vasilyevich Andreyev	1947/1966	Russian	Cheremkhovo GVK, Irkutsk Oblast, father Vasily Ivanovich Andreyev, mother Nina Viktorovna Andreyeva; Cheremkhovo, Pereulok Ugolnyy, 12
96	Torpedoman	Seaman Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozlenko	1947/1966	Russian	Central RVK, Khabarovsk, father Vladimir Timofeyevich Kozlenko, mother Lidiya Ivanovna Kozlenko, Primorskiy Kray, Artem, Ulitsa Kolkhoznaya, 75
97	Senior SPS specialist	Chief Petty Officer Gennadiy Fedorovich Gushchin	1946/1966	Russian	Tulun RVK, Irkutsk Oblast, wife Vera Gushchina, father Fedor Fedorovich Gushchin, mother Anna Vasilyevna, Tulun, Ulitsa Dachnaya, 4, Apt 2
98	Engine-room man	Seaman Georgiy Ivanovich Bashkov	1947/1966	Russian	Sarapul RVK, Udmurt ASSR, mother Raisa Ivanovna Moiseyeva, Karkalay Station, Udmurt ASSR

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Deputy Chief of GlavKEU on Military Housing

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[Interview with Colonel Nikolay Filippenko, GlavKEU deputy chief, Russian Federation, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Yuriy Viktorov: "Apartment Exchange: A Headache for the Military"; date and place not given]

[Text] Colonel Nikolay Filippenko, deputy chief of the GlavKEU [Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate], Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, answers questions put to him by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Viktorov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, if you do not mind, may we start our discussion by considering a real-life situation, one in which reader Nataliya Ivanovna Shustova finds herself. "A disease of the spinal cord has reduced me to group 2 disability," she writes. "It is difficult for me to move around. There even is no way for me to catch a breath of fresh air, since my apartment is located on the first floor, and, this being the case, there is no balcony. My husband, who is in military service, has submitted a request for exchanging our apartment for a similar one, but with a balcony. The housing commission turned down the request. I find it most unpleasant to face another winter of taking my walks at the window."

What kind of advice to give our reader? Her situation is indeed unusual.

[Filippenko] Following the letter of the law, based on what she writes, there are really no grounds for an exchange, since Nataliya Ivanovna's family is indeed provided with housing. However, in this case we do not wish to act like formalists. Therefore, in my view, the garrison's military authorities should start looking for some kind of other housing for the Shustovs. This is the humanitarian thing to do.

[Viktorov] It is not my place to tell you that there is quite a number of situations similar to the one above throughout the Armed Forces. It may be a case of someone's being transferred to a new duty station, or a matter of a person's health not permitting him to reside in a particular area. And the number of housing exchange problems caused by withdrawal of our troops from neighboring countries! What do you think about the resulting situation?

[Filippenko] The exchange situation is extremely difficult. The primary cause is that the Ministry of Defense lacks (and never did have) an agency charged with the mission of exchanging housing for servicemen. This holds true for the CIS, Russia, and even the capital

garrison. As a rule, all servicemen effect an exchange independently, via local offices; in Moscow, for example, they turn to Moszhilservis.

Nonetheless, reality steps into the picture to force involvement of GlavKEU, especially in the event there is a need for the Russian side to effect a resolution with a neighboring country in this kind of matter. In this case, we communicate our concurrence to the deputy commander or to the chief of the KEU [billeting and maintenance directorate] of the particular military district. Please do not consider this to be something ostentatious on our part; it is simply a case of people's interests transcending everything else. We try to do our part, regardless of how difficult a situation may be.

[Viktorov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, is there a legal basis for exchanging servicemen's apartments within the framework of the former USSR?

[Filippenko] Yes. In accordance with an agreement reached in February of last year in Minsk, exchange within the framework of the CIS is guided by the same rules in effect prior to the dissolution of the Union.

[Viktorov] How does this pertain to persons who have remained in the Baltics?

[Filippenko] A special provision covers that. In essence, the Baltics are to be considered distant countries, with whom housing exchange will be generally impossible after the interstate agreements are completed. There actually is no such exchange at present, even though many servicemen and pensioners wish to return to Russia. On the other hand, there are virtually no persons wishing to settle in the Baltic countries. Take the case of Latvia. Even persons of native birth arriving from Russia to take up residence there are not being granted citizenship. Who wants to be a second-class person? That is why no one is settling there.

[Viktorov] If exchange of housing is impossible, could there be some other arrangement, such as selling?

[Filippenko] The last round of negotiations held with the Latvian side on 15-17 October produced a preliminary agreement whereby military pensioners would be granted the right to either sell their housing at auction or receive a guarantee of compensation for their housing. However, information I have in my possession indicates that, for some reason, doubt has been cast over this agreement. We will attempt to clear up this issue in negotiations.

The situation is about the same in Estonia.

Much simpler is the situation in Lithuania. There it is permitted to privatize housing, and many servicemen in units being withdrawn from the area have taken advantage of the opportunity by privatizing their apartments and then selling them. Some military retirees have acted in the same manner.

[Viktorov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, what about the "hot spots"?

[Filippov] Let us start with Tajikistan. In essence, we have the 201st Motorized Rifle Division left there. An order issued by the Ministry of Defense has rendered the division's officers and warrant officers eligible for housing in Russian cities.

As far as members of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus is concerned, construction and acquisition of housing for them and for members of the SKVO [North Caucasus Military District] and other areas of Russia has already been initiated. In 1992 and 1993, 976 apartments for the GRVZ [Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus] were acquired on Russian soil. Plans call for acquiring 150 additional apartments by the end of this year.

[Viktorov] That pertains to service personnel. There are quite a few Ministry of Defense retirees, former SA [Soviet Army] laborers and white collar personnel in those "hot spots." What about them?

[Filippov] Believe me, we take the problems of that category of person to heart as well. It is difficult to expect a rapid solution to those problems, of course, due to the lean military budget. Nonetheless, we are not running away from a search for solutions to this most difficult situation.

[Viktorov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, the mail received by the editors suggests another question we put to you—that of the so-called closed military installations. What is to happen to those people who have completed their service and have lost contact with the Ministry of Defense but who would like to leave those bases?

[Filippov] An order issued way back by the Union government called for their resettlement in housing to be made available by local organs of authority. The process is under way, after a fashion, at a pace that is extremely unsatisfactory. It is sufficient to say that with last year's requirement for 52,700 apartments, local soviets provided the Ministry of Defense with only 144. The figures for this year are, respectively, 59,057 and 33.

There is a proposal for permitting exchange of this kind of housing. This is generally not a good solution, since who would wish to take the place vacated by a retiree in a closed military installation?

It happens that additional "punishment" is heaped upon persons residing on the above installations, in that an installation is not really closed, but merely enjoying such status by declaration of the base's military authorities. This kind of act on the part of commanders may be easily explained: They fear that new persons will be sent in to occupy the vacated housing. Nonetheless, it should be understood that there is no excuse for violating the law, even though intentions may be good. We maintain a list of closed installations approved for the districts. In the event

we receive a complaint regarding illegal acts on the part of officials, such as hindrance of apartment privatization, that is when we step in.

Action can be taken at the local level by appealing to the district deputy commander for construction and troop billeting. In the event a serviceman is not satisfied, he can take the case to court.

[Viktorov] Do you see a major solution?

[Filippov] The problem of housing in closed military installations must be resolved in a fundamentally new manner. Being worked out presently is an in-service, the "regimental," approach. For example, assume that a unit's table of organization is such that 500 apartments are required. They are built, and they belong to the unit and to none other. Further assume that a man completes his active duty and is to depart. To go where? To his own apartment, one a lieutenant starts to build beginning with his first day of duty. To work toward this end, a certain amount of money is deducted from his pay during all the years of his active duty and placed into a bank account. The necessary amount of money is accumulated in 20 to 25 years, with bank interest added.

Two or 3 years before leaving the service, the serviceman designates the city in which he wishes to settle. The bank transmits to that city the particular sum of money for application to the housing construction. The military quarters thus vacated now become available for a new person joining the unit.

For this purpose, we wish to organize a special bank, with a military insurance company involved. The arrangement is being worked out with the apparatus of First Deputy Minister A. Kokoshin, the Combined Committee of Apartment-Seeking Servicemen of the Moscow Garrison, and the Military Insurance Company.

It will require time, of course, to effect a fundamental change, to dispense forever with the housing distribution system; that is, to do the same as the rest of the civilized world. It should be understood that the plan can be possible only in the presence of economic and political stability in society.

Military Trade Union Work Supporting Servicemen's Rights

94UM0124B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Ivanyuk: "Wage Agreement in Army Conditions: Still More Problems Than Solutions"]

[Text] This year has been important in a special way for the army trade unions. For the first time, all their work has been based on the branch wage agreement of the Federation of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Workers and Office Employees, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Federation Ministry of

Labor, which was announced by the defense minister in Order No. 197 in 1993. How has it been carried out, and what has it done for Army and Navy civilian personnel? Let us attempt to tally some of the results at the end of the year, a year that has been difficult from an economic standpoint, especially for workers paid from the budget.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the agreement has worked well even in these difficult conditions. Despite the financial difficulties, the Ministry of Defense found ways to improve labor remuneration and material incentives. Repeated appeals to the government made it possible to increase the wage rates up to 50 percent and to earmark up to half of the annual wage fund for bonuses. Benefits were introduced for education, health, and cultural workers living in rural areas; pay was introduced for civilian specialists on alert duty; regional wage regulation was improved, and supplementary bonuses for uninterrupted service were increased. And after these decisions were adopted at the government level, the documents did not spend months circulating in ministry corridors, as used to be the case, but were quickly sent to the units by telegram. It should come as little surprise that they were received rather enthusiastically by labor collectives, especially Order No. 129 and Order No. 130, which the defense minister issued in the first quarter.

But closer to the end of the first six months, it became clear that efforts to keep up with price increases were not succeeding. And Russian presidential Edict No. 842 of 3 June, "On Certain Measures to Curb Inflation," essentially blocked section three of the branch wage agreement. The issues dealt with in that paragraph (payment of leave entitlements, insurance, exemption of Defense Ministry organizations from the added-value tax, and other measures that significantly improve the workers' material, social, and consumer-service situation) were submitted to the Russian Federation government for consideration and resolution. In July 1993 prices, these measures required almost 2 billion rubles. The treasury didn't have the money for these things, and it still doesn't today.

Meanwhile, the situation is critical. And if Army and Navy workers and office employees have not held mass strikes like the miners, this is due solely to their high degree of conscientiousness and to their special legal situation, which does not allow such actions. Veterans remember how even during the war years, financing was provided monthly. But today, money is distributed only as it becomes available. Funds might be distributed several times in one week, but more often there is nothing to distribute. And how can you ask a person whose wages haven't reached the subsistence minimum lately and, moreover, haven't been paid on time, to give his work everything he's got? But this has to be done during this time of personnel shortages in order to somehow maintain the forces' vital activities.

Throughout this period, the Federation of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Workers and Office Employees did not

sit around doing nothing. "We tried to call the attention of the national leadership and the Ministry of Defense to the emerging situation," said Federation Deputy Chairman Vladimir Volkov. "In addition, we took part in setting norms, exercising our right of legislative initiative. Very many difficulties, unfortunately, stem from the uncertain legal status of civilian personnel in the Armed Forces."

Of course, the most difficult situation obtains in the near foreign countries, where financial problems are many times more acute and the status of civilians working in military units is altogether unclear. When a Russian citizen went to work, for example, in the Western Group of Forces, he knew every last term of his contract. But what about in the near foreign countries? What are the rights of citizens of republics that do not belong to the CIS but in which Russian military units are stationed, if they work in these units? To start, we should at least clarify the social and legal status of Russian Federation citizens in Russia, since they are pursuing careers with the Armed Forces voluntarily and under contract.

By analogy with the Law "On the Status of Servicemen," the executive committee of the Federation of Trade Unions made such attempts with the support of the Defense Ministry. But a kind of impasse has arisen here too. To expect that the Federal Assembly, after its election, will be able to consider such a law in the foreseeable future is simply unrealistic, for it will inherit many other urgent matters—as well as hundreds of other laws that have already undergone various kinds of preliminary study—from the Supreme Soviet, and all these things will have to be considered. The only realistic option is to change the corresponding paragraph in the branch agreement and to ask the government to confirm the Statute on Benefits for Civilian Personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, in accordance with the Law "On Defense." The Federation of Trade Unions, in conjunction with the Defense Ministry, is currently studying this question.

This step is of fundamental importance in and of itself, since the civil rights of Army and Navy workers and office employees are restricted, albeit less so than those of military personnel. And so it is necessary to offset this with certain benefits and advantages. Many readers who bring such complaints to the newspaper emphasize that what bothers them is not that they aren't getting something, but the fact that, in principle, they are deprived of the right to establish a claim to anything. For example, defense minister Order No. 285, which has regulated housing issues in the Army and Navy ever since 1975, states explicitly that workers and office employees are to be provided with apartments at their place of residence. In other words, they do not appear to have the right to even dream of getting housing at their place of service.

In the new conditions, such a relationship between a worker and his employer, in the form of the Defense Ministry, is hardly justified—especially considering the fact that the Defense Ministry has one million civilian

employees today, and they have a very strong influence on the state of affairs in the forces. With the cutbacks in the Armed Forces, in accordance with defense minister Order No. 295, which took effect this year, they are permitted to substitute in the forces for 40 officer positions and for more than 200 positions normally held by warrant Army and Navy warrant officers, extended-duty servicemen, senior sergeants, soldiers, and seamen, and to hold such important positions as leading research associates, test engineers, designers, chief designers, chiefs of apartment-operation services, chiefs of aircraft maintenance services, and others.

According to some estimates, the number of workers and office employees could grow by 15 percent in the next few years, and they will play an increasingly important role in strengthening the country's defense capability. This means that we must work to solve their problems too—to come up with funds, to improve the legal foundation, and to observe mutual agreements more strictly. This was the subject of a recent meeting of a trilateral commission that discussed progress in implementing the wage agreement. A decision was taken to extend the agreement to 1994. The deadline for assembling and reaching agreement on amendments and changes in the document based on the past year's experience and on all outstanding problems expired today.

Note: Major-General Viktor Rudik, chief of the labor and wages administration for Russian Armed Forces civilian personnel, reports that by decision of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers of 7 December 1993, No. 1268, the monthly wage rate for category-one of the uniform wage rate for budget-sphere workers was set at 16,000 rubles as of 1 December.

Based on this, the wages of Defense Ministry workers and office employees, in accordance with Russian Defense Minister Order No. 130 of March 8, 1993, is being doubled.

Status, Future Needs of Military Air Transport

94UM0121A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Colonel Aleksandr Manushkin: "Will the Ruslan Stay Up in the Sky? Russia Needs a Program To Develop Military Air Transport"]

[Text] It was the third day of flying. The An-124 Ruslan airship, which took off from Melbourne, Australia, crossed over the South Pole, refueled in Brazil and Morocco; then crossed the North Pole, refueled once again at one of Russia's Far Eastern military airfields; and by the end of the third day closed the ring around the globe. I was lucky to participate in this flight. Piloted by two crews headed by test pilots Lieutenant General of Aviation L. Kozlov and Colonel Yu. Resnitskiy, in 3 days of flying the Ruslan set seven world and 10 all-Russian records. Three years have passed since then, but no one has yet been able to either surpass or repeat

these accomplishments by Russian pilots. The fact that in three days of truly nonstop flight the airship never underwent technical maintenance (brief landings were made only for refueling) also says something about the high operating reliability of the Ruslan. This is the sort of aviation equipment Russian military air transport possesses.

Military air transport. VTA [military air transport] is presently equipped with medium An-12 and Il-76 airplanes and heavy An-22 Antey and An-124 Ruslan airplanes. All of them are outfitted with reliable sighting and navigation systems and inter-aircraft navigation systems. This makes it possible to airlift troops and equipment, and land airborne forces day and night in adverse weather and navigating conditions, and in the presence of air defense countermeasures.

The **An-12** was the first specialized military transport airplane built in the Soviet Union. It is capable of parachute landing on two platforms weighing a total of 16 tonnes or 90 paratroopers, and of taking off from ill-prepared landing strips, including dirt strips of limited dimensions. It has shown itself to be simple to operate, and to be highly reliable in the most diverse geographic and climatic conditions.

The **An-22 Antey** was the world's first heavy military air transport airplane. It was introduced two years before the similar American C-5 (1969). The dimensions of its cargo cabin (length without ramp 26.4 m, width and height 4.4 m each) permitted airlifting of almost all combat equipment of the ground forces and the equipment of other armed services, which practically solved the problem of airlift capability of combat equipment in those days. The demand for airplanes capable of carrying oversized cargo remains very high even today.

The **Il-76 (Il-76M, Il-76MD)** has been the main airplane in VTA since 1974. Its different modifications have a maximum lifting capacity of from 28 to 43 tons. Airliner turbojet engines allow a cruising speed that is 1.5 times greater than that of the An-12. The dimensions of the cargo cabin (length 20.0 m, width 3.45 m, height 3.4 m) permit parachute landing of three or four platforms with a total weight of 42 tons, and make up to 75 percent of the combat equipment of the different armed services airliftable.

The **Ruslan An-124** is the world's largest military transport airplane. Its maximum operating take-off weight is 392 tonnes. The unique dimensions of the cargo cabin (36.5 x 6.4 x 4.4 m) permit transport of practically all combat equipment of the armed services. Possessing a lifting capacity and range that are two to three times greater than those of the An-22 and Il-76, it consumes 1.5-2 times less fuel per ton of airlifted cargo.

I have managed to fly aboard all types of VTA airplanes in the line of duty. I know first-hand about the missions and problems of these air garrisons. There is good reason why aviators in military air transport are referred to as

"laborers of the sky." Practically all crews in military air transport have experienced runs lasting many days to the most remote corners of the country, and to neighboring and distant countries. This, when due to the absence of travel money they had to eat and sleep aboard the airplane, when a fuel truck or an airfield engine starting unit had to be begged or "commandeered" from "alien" airports, and other such "life's tribulations." And despite the fact that these toilers get little in return for their nomadic way of life, they conscientiously fulfill their duty, sometimes at the limit of human endurance. Together with paratroopers, VTA crews were the first to arrive in Afghanistan and the last to leave. They were also the first to reach Armenia after the earthquake. In 20 days of December 1988 360 VTA airplanes flew over 1,200 sorties. They carried 380 truck-mounted cranes, 180 tractors, bulldozers and excavators, more than 10,000 tents and yurts, and over 37,000 tons of other equipment and cargo needed in the rescue efforts.

I have been to the air force TsKP (central command post). Who in the air force flies on days off and even on holidays? Only VTA crews. They fly from 50 to 100 sorties daily. Despite the shortage of aviation fuel, spare parts and other expendables (this topic needs special discussion), the intensity of flying in VTA is high. I

selected 1 December of this year at random, and asked: What routes were the crews flying that day? On this day VTA carried out 49 special assignments. (On other days this figure can double.) The planned assignments included:

a) in the Transcaucasus—10 An-22 and Il-76 airplanes. Delivery of food, and transport of military dependents and refugees on the return leg;

b) in the Western Group of Forces (Germany)—9 An-22 and Il-76 airplanes. Planned troop withdrawal;

c) in Dushanbe—2 Il-76 airplanes. Delivery of food and medicine, and transport of military dependents and soldiers discharged into the reserves on the return leg.

Five runs to Tiksy, Anadyr, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy and Vladivostok to carry food and goods to garrisons in the Far North and Far East were planned in the interests of the Central Trade Administration. In addition, five VTA regiments flew planned training flights on this day.

In short, reports tossed out by some mass media suggesting that air force airplanes are laid up, that VTA just about disintegrated after the USSR collapsed, do not correspond to reality, to put it mildly.

Basic Specifications of Russian Military Transport Airplanes

Airplane type	Year adopted	Cruising speed	Maximum cargo capacity	Range with maximum payload	Maximum ferrying distance
An-12	1958	480km/hr	20tonnes	2,000km	5,800km
An-22 Antey	1967	560km/hr	60tonnes	5,000km	11,000km
Il-76MD	1974	750km/hr	43tonnes	4,000km	7,500km
An-124 Ruslan	1988	800km/hr	120tonnes	5,000km	16,000km

Basic Specifications of U.S. Military Transport Airplanes

Airplane type	Year adopted	Cruising speed	Maximum cargo capacity	Range with maximum payload	Range with minimum load
C-130 Hercules	From late 1950s	520km/hr	25 tonnes	3,750km	6,800km
C-141 Starlifter	1980	800km/hr	42.8tonnes	5,000km	6,600km
C-5A Galaxy	1959	820km/hr	93 tonnes	6,050km	9,300km
C-5B Galaxy	1983	900km/hr	111 tonnes	5,200km	9,550km

Naturally, Russian military air transport suffered considerable losses as a result of division of the Army among former union republics. Over 200 VTA airplanes remained beyond Russia's borders. Moreover, most of them were the latest modifications of the Il-76MD, and their flying time was still low. However, Russian VTA has basically been reorganized by now. Relocated air units are adapting themselves to their new places with difficulty, with considerable problems. And of course, VTA never stopped combat training for a single day. The Russian president, who recently visited Tula and saw the aviators at work, had high praise for the skill of air force personnel in general and VTA personnel in particular.

Of course, as is true with the entire Army, maintenance of VTA is an expensive proposition for the state. Each

airplane costs billions of rubles (for example a new Il-76 costs R6 billion), and each tonne of aviation fuel costs around R170,000. Given the present political and economic turmoil in the country, it is difficult, and almost impossible, to preserve and multiply the combat potential of VTA. But this is something that has to be done. No matter what competent specialists I spoke with, they were all unanimous in their opinion: In view of its economic and geographic position and political importance in the world arena, Russia needs military air transport like it needs air. Our country is one of the few states in the world in which there are large cities and there are places where entire peoples live and which can be reached, as that song goes, only by airplane. Their life support requires a huge air and ground transportation

fleet. Furthermore, Russian territory is significantly greater in area for example than the United States. Given the reductions in the Army, we can no longer maintain identically strong groupings of ground and other forces in different regions. Consequently, their mobility is now acquiring very great significance. And only military air transport is able to support this mobility, to transfer forces quickly as reinforcements into a particular region.

For example, the USA is also reducing its Army. But it is not reducing its military air transport—on the contrary it is increasing it.

The forces and resources of military air transport and refueling aviation in the United States are under the Military Airlift Command—MAC. (Our refueling airplanes belong to strategic aviation.) The United States has one refueling air army and two military airlift armies under MAC. Each army consists of three strategic airlift wings (C-141 Starlifter, C-5A and C-5B Galaxy airplanes) and two tactical airlift wings (C-130 Hercules airplanes). According to data available to me there are 390 strategic and 640 tactical military transport airplanes in MAC today. In a time of full mobilization, the United States can bring in over 700 airplanes for strategic forces and cargo (this is not counting tactical military air transport). This is achieved by using reserves and dual-purpose civilian airliners. We, however, cannot use civilian airplanes when the need arises.

The following examples say something about the high mobility of American forces. During the operations of United Nations multinational forces in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), transport airplanes of the U.S. Air Force and civilian airplanes recruited for these purposes flew over 700 trips and transferred over 27,000 personnel and over 15,000 tonnes of cargo. During Operation Desert Storm 10,000 sorties were flown, and around 3,000 persons and over 270,000 tonnes of cargo were carried into the Persian Gulf zone from August 1990 to March 1991.

In short, mobility of any forces would be unimaginable without military air transport. And the Americans, who know how to make every dollar count, invest sizable resources into it. For example, the forces will soon be receiving the new C-17 military transporter. Its experimental models have already been flying since 1987. Possessing economical engines and equipped with an air-to-air refueling system (by the way, all strategic military transporters of the USA have such a system), the C-17 can transport and land all types of organic weapons, forces and combat equipment. It is capable of operating from poorly prepared and dirt airfields with a short landing strip.

So what about us? I am far from the notion that today's Russia should compete with the Americans in development of military air transport. It would be sufficient to say that the fleet of these aircraft is significantly smaller in our country than in the USA. Moreover, the missions of Russian VTA differ in many ways from the American

organization. But as long as we have sufficiently powerful air transport (which is also useful to the national economy), and if we are thinking about not only preserving but also reinforcing VTA for the sake of the entire Army's mobility, then we need to consider the future.

In my opinion, the future of VTA is uncertain today. All of the problems stem from insufficient financing. Had the Soviet Union not collapsed, and had the Russian treasury not been depleted, VTA would have begun receiving a new military transport airplane produced by S. Ilyushin's firm, which is not inferior to the American C-17, by as early as the current decade. But because of the absence of money, work on this aircraft is barely alive, and none of the plans for its commissioning are being met. The huge output capacities of aviation plants producing the Il-76MD and the An-124 Ruslan are currently standing idle, while the air force is unable to place orders for them because it has nothing with which to pay for them. It would be sufficient to say that in the last 3 years not a single airliner has been added to VTA. And in the meantime the existing fleet of airplanes is aging, their life is being used up. Two Antey aircraft have already served their full useful life, and have been written off and dismantled for spare parts. Airplanes are standing idle because of a shortage of storage batteries and tires (wheels), and because the engines have served their useful life. The engines are being repaired at plants, but there's no money with which to get them out of hock. If money isn't found by 1 January 1994, a third of the Ruslans and 12 percent of the Il-76 fleet will have to be laid up.

But the airplanes aren't the worst of the problem. People have nowhere to live! As of today 5,240 families of servicemen just in VTA do not have living quarters. This includes around 2,000 pilots. This year 564 families received apartments. But this is just a drop in the bucket. At this rate, the earliest many of the people on today's waiting lists will acquire their own roof over their heads will be 9 years from now. The VTA commander is keeping a constant finger on the apartment problem. He has toured all of "his" garrisons with this problem in mind. For example, he reached an agreement with the local administration in Taganrog to immediately allocate 20 apartments ready for occupancy. A contract was drawn up, but there is money to pay for it. The amount—R470 million. Where is this money to be had? And in Orenburg, for example, he was able to reach agreement with the administration, and people (officers and their families) began moving in without making the prepayments. But such obliging people are rare today. As a rule they are operating according to the principle of the heroes Ilf and Petrov: Money in the morning, chairs in the evening. You can't sign for anything—such are market relations.

Many new VTA garrisons do not even offer conditions for normal operation of airplanes. Assume for example that a regiment has been relocated to an airfield used previously by fighters, which are significantly smaller in

size than VTA airplanes. The appropriate parking pads are needed, but there aren't any. Significantly larger containers for fuel, space for technical maintenance units and many, many other things are needed. But in the meantime maintenance must be carried on in bitter cold, at an airfield exposed to all four winds. People sometimes work in inhuman conditions, while receiving their pay 2-3 months late. Some are unable to endure, they fill out discharge applications, and sometimes you can't blame them. But the bulk, the core of the military

collectives are staying together, and continuing to toil. Moreover they are working conscientiously. What is keeping them going? It's no longer fashionable today to speak in flowery phrases, but I can't find any epithets for these people other than "duty," "honor" and "conscience." In short, VTA lived in the past, is living now, and I think it will go on living in the future. Were the country's leadership to find the resources to support it, people capable of improving and strengthening military air transport are already in place.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian-Latvian Talks Stuck on Withdrawal From Skrunda

94UM0125A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Gromak: "Russian Radar at Skrunda Is the Stumbling Block"]

[Text] The regularly scheduled round of Russian-Latvian talks has concluded. During the three days, the draft treaty on radar in the city of Skrunda was the topic of discussion. During the talks, the parties did not reach any fundamental agreement on the terms for keeping the Russian radar in Latvia temporarily.

The head of the Latvian delegation, Martins Virsis, declined to comment on this round of talks. The head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Sergey Zotov, emphasized in a talk with journalists that the "delay in discussing an agreement on the radar is postponing the signing of the closely related troop withdrawal treaty."

UKRAINE

Budget Shortfalls Lead to Commercialization of Military

94UM0127A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 45, 7 Nov 93 p 3a

[Article by Aleksandr Zhilin: "Army: Businessmen Command Aviation"]

[Text] The grave economic crisis in Ukraine is dealing a tough blow to the Army. It seems that the republic is unable to maintain its armed forces at full strength.

National-state ambitions do not allow cutbacks in the armed forces. As a result, certain military-commercial hybrids have appeared in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. For example, military-transport aviation, equipped with IL-76 airplanes, is being turned over to the control of commercial structures! MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has learned that the 37th Military Aviation-Transport Regiment (military unit No. 54918, commanded by Colonel Bayev), stationed in the city of Artsiz, is at the service of the commercial firms "Atlanta" [Atlanta] and "Yuzhnyy bereg Kryma" [Crimean South Shore]. They are financing the planes' maintenance, buying aircraft engines and fuel, and organizing the retraining of crews for international flights. After that, the military pilots will carry out orders from the businessmen, hauling cargo.

As is commonly known, army airplanes cannot fly certain international air routes. In order to avoid complications, the Ukrainian entrepreneurs are repainting the military airplanes to resemble "civilian airliners." However, this does not alter the essential state of affairs. It turns out that the crews of military-transport airplanes,

whose chief mission is to drop assault forces on enemy territory, have begun overflying the airfields of foreign countries. In international practice, this is nonsense.

A noteworthy detail: A deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, seeking to justify the commercialization of military-transport aviation, said: "The international flight experience being gained by our crews could come in very handy for us in the event of war, since the pilots will master international OVD [joint military operations] and test the technical facilities of many foreign airfields. In addition, we will be able to invigorate the branch of military intelligence associated with air traffic."

The Ukrainian military aviation chief is not bluffing. Indeed, few military crews get a chance to overfly the airfields of a "likely adversary." And special equipment installed on the pseudocommercial airliners will make it possible to obtain unique intelligence data.

We should point out that a similar air regiment stationed in Krivoy Rog has already begun making "commercial-intelligence" international flights.

Radetskyy on Ukrainian Contribution to CIS Defense

LD2212122393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1147 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Ashgabat December 22 TASS—"Ukraine will contribute most actively to the work of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States and plans to have permanent representatives on the Headquarters of the CIS joint armed forces." Ukrainian Defense Minister General Vitaliy Radetskyy told a meeting of the heads of CIS defence ministries here today. He noted that the Ukrainian leadership had revised its attitude to the CIS military coordinating bodies, from which it was previously absent. Today, Ukraine is interested in promoting close cooperation with them.

Turning to problems of the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear armaments, General Radetskyy stressed that his ministry was ready to conduct a constructive dialogue with the Russian Defense Ministry and other states, interested in the settlement of these issues.

Radetskiy on Changing Stance Toward CIS Joint Forces

LD2212120493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1130 GMT 22 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Ashgabat, 22 December—Ukraine will be taking the most active part in the work of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, and is pursuing the goal of having its

permanent representatives at the headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. This was stated today by General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskiy, the Ukrainian Defense Minister, at a session of the heads of military departments of the Commonwealth countries in Ashgabat. He noted that the republic's leadership has reconsidered its attitude toward the CIS coordinating military bodies in which it was not participating earlier. Ukraine is interested in cooperation with these military bodies.

BALTIC STATES

Latvia's Zemessargi Short of Weapons, Munitions

94UM0124A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Gromak: "Upset Because There's Just One Grenade for Three—Latvia's Zemessargi Don't Want To Give Up Weapons Even When Off Duty"]

[Text] Riga—The ranks of the Zemessargi, the Latvian Republic's popular militia, are growing, said republic President Guntis Ulmanis at the second Zemessargi conference. But what about its problems? In the view of the Zemessargi, they are virtually nonexistent. Just 30 weapons were lost this year. If you add the 20 in 1992, the result is insignificant—only one weapon has been lost for every 340 volunteers.

The problems lie elsewhere. For example, the personnel of the 18th Zemessargi Battalion were upset that there is just one grenade for every three volunteers and that they are forced to buy bullets at their own expense. In order to avoid weapons losses, it was proposed to improve the way they are kept: According to one volunteer, Modris Zermanis, a medical academy student, students should be allowed to keep weapons in their dormitories.

A member of the 23rd Battalion took an even simpler approach to this question. He proposed that volunteers be authorized to carry weapons not only when in uniform and on duty, but also when off duty. The danger of this proposal is obvious: Fifty people have died at the hands of these valorous "guardians of order" in the republic in 1993. But this clearly doesn't bother the Zemessargi.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Activities of Armenian Military Preparatory School

944K0439C Yerevan HAYASTANI
HANRAPETUTYUN in Armenian 15 Oct 93 p 4

[Text] Two years ago the special republican boarding school named after Field Marshal Hamazasp Babajanian [Babadzhanyan], a former Commander of the Armored and Tank Troops, was converted into a boarding school for military training by the decision of the Armenian Government. On October 18 the school will hold a ceremony whereby 100 students who have passed their

examinations will take their oath to serve their homeland selflessly. Vrezh Hovhannisian, the commandant of the [school] battalion, told the correspondent of NOYYAN TAPAN: "The students at the school have their own special military uniform. They specialize in military science and physical education. The young men are trained in judo, hand-to-hand combat, mountain climbing, swimming, light athletics and skiing. The specialization subjects are taught by officers and athletics instructors. Special attention is paid to the teaching of English and Russian. In the future it is planned to teach the languages of countries neighboring Armenia.

The school admits those 14 to 16-year-old young men who possess the appropriate physical and mental capabilities." The director of the school has visited a U.S. military base where he observed first-hand the methods of training American professional soldiers. According to the Commandant, some of the school's graduates have entered the school of the Karabakh liberation struggle and participated in numerous tough battles. The school has also signed agreements with Russian military training institutions, whereby the graduates of the school are able to continue their education at those institutions. The Armenian Ministry of Defense will pay for the expenses of such continued training.

Andreasian Replaces Armenian Chief of General Staff

944K0439A Yerevan AZG in Armenian 23 Oct 93 p 1

[Text] Yesterday President Levon Ter Petrosian signed a decree releasing Norat Ter Grigoriants, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the general staff, from his responsibilities at his request and appointing Lieutenant General Hrach Hmayaki Andreasian to replace him. Circles close to the president's staff maintained that this replacement does not imply any changes in military policy. The same sources also indicated that Norat Ter Grigoriants has not yet been offered a new position.

Karabakh Commander on Status of Military Forces

944K0440A Yerevan AZG in Armenian 23 Nov 93 p 4

[Interview with Samvel Babayan, commander of the Armed Forces of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, by correspondent Maksim Hovhannisian]

[Excerpts] Samvel Babayan was born in Stepanakert in 1965. He is a graduate of the local School No. 7. He served in the Soviet Army from 1983 through 1985. He has been an active participant in the Karabakh movement. He was imprisoned in 1991 during the Safonov Polyanichko regime. After staying in prison for six months he was exchanged with Azerbaijan's deputy chief justice who was "kidnaped" by Samvel's comrades headed by his brother, Garo. Samvel is one of the organizers of Karabakh's first guerrilla squads. During the "Ring" operation his squad liberated the Dzamdzor village of the Hadrut region. He then participated in the

liberation of Khojalu, Kharadakhlu, and Shushi. Subsequent military operations were planned and implemented under his leadership. He is also a deputy in the Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR]. He is married and has two children. Below is an interview with Samvel Babayan, commander of the NKR Armed Forces, by Maksim Hovhannisian, head of the NKR's information and press department. The interview was conducted last week just before the regrettable incident at Matakhis (involving an attack on the Russian envoy) for which the NKR State Defense Committee severely criticized the leadership of the defense forces.

[Hovhannisian] Let us begin this interview with the most important question: Do we or do we not have an army?

[Babayan] We do. Despite all of its flaws, today our republic has a regular army which is able to defend our borders against enemy incursions and ensure that people can work in peace. Furthermore, if it becomes necessary to strike at the enemy on its own territory to ensure the security of the people, our army is capable of accomplishing such tasks.

[Hovhannisian] How was the idea of creating a regular army born?

[Babayan] When we liberated Shushi and opened the Lachin corridor, we realized that we needed to create a regular army in order to preserve our military gains over the long run. Many agreed with that idea but did not take any concrete steps. At this point certain mistakes were made. Then the painful period of failures began. First we lost Shahumyan, then most of the Martakert region. Many people lost faith in our forces. Despair became our greatest enemy.

In order to overcome this string of failures it was necessary to launch a decisive counterstrike against the enemy. That could only be done by a well-trained regular army, which we did not have.

At the beginning it was very difficult. Many of the guerrilla squads refused to obey general orders, and their forces operated in a haphazard manner. It was relatively easy to implement our plans in the Askeran region and the results were observed quickly.

The process of creating an army began to move forward in August of last year. Of course, it cannot be said that we have solved all the problems associated with the creation of an army. However, we have established a barracks regime in the army, except that a battle proposal by the general command is not considered a battle order. Also, orders are carried out in a qualified manner, although not always. That is related to the training of the army. Mechanisms of army life are being created and perfected with each battle.

[Hovhannisian] These days there is much talk in the press about the offensive operations of the NKR Army. It is said that the Army has a vested interest in such operations.

[Babayan] Yes, some newspapers have written that everyone wants peace except the Army. That is not true. What the Army is doing has only two objectives: to ensure the security of the population and the inviolability of our state borders and to force the enemy to recognize our national rights. All of our operations are coordinated with the NKR leadership. Let us take the demilitarization of the Kelbajar region. Without that operation it would be impossible to return the refugees from Martakert to their homes because there was always the danger that the enemy could strike from behind. There was a time when the panicked residents of Martakert were not only abandoning their homes but were also deserting the ranks. Now the situation is completely different. Today the borders of that region are defended only by the military units of that region.

Let us take another example. Why was it necessary to demilitarize the city of Agdam? First, it was necessary to stop the artillery attacks from Agdam on Askeran and Stepanakert. Second, it was necessary to force the enemy to sit at the negotiating table. As is known, the first official Azeri-Karabakh talks began after the fall of Agdam. However, Azerbaijan declined to continue that dialogue at the instigation of certain international forces.

[Hovhannisian] The world press and international organizations hastily condemned the advances of the NKR Army. Despite those condemnations, we undertook military operations on the southern front. How can that be interpreted? Are we thumbing our noses at world opinion? Are we confronting international forces? Is not our posture defiant?

[Babayan] That is how it appears at first glance, but the actual state of affairs tells a completely different story. As you know, in 1991 the Azeris occupied 24 villages in Hadrut with their "Ring" operation. Second, they were shelling Martuni, Hadrut, Edillu and other Armenian population centers as well as the Lachin corridor continuously from Fizuli and Kubatlu. Third, we made it known to them that things will not end with Agdam and that they must reckon with the reality that has been created. It is these considerations that prompted the launching of military operations on the southwestern front. As a result, there were Azeri-Karabakh talks in Moscow sponsored by the Russian Federation. It is not a secret for anyone that NKR gained international recognition as a party to the conflict only after our military successes. People recognize might. I repeat: the NKR Army wants peace, and, in my opinion, we must have a strong and battleworthy army so that peace will come quickly.

The Azeri side requested several times to extend the ceasefire. We agreed, although we know very well that they are using that time to regroup their forces. We are similarly preparing to greet the enemy appropriately.

[Hovhannisian] Let us return to the problems associated with the creation of an army.

[Babayan] The [NKR Army] must be a battleworthy mobile entity equipped with modern weaponry; it must be ready to strike at the enemy at any point in the republic; and it must be able to defend our borders on land and in the air. I do not think that it is possible for NKR to survive without such an army.

[Hovhannisian] That is how it has turned out to be. Perhaps one of the peculiarities of the Karabakh movement is that our fedayeen [guerrilla] boys have risen to the highest ranks of the Army. These boys are patriotic, brave and prepared to defend our land, but many of them have no military training. Some of them have not even served in the [Soviet] Army.

[Babayan] That was the case at the beginning. Today we have in our Army hundreds of senior professional officers who have received serious training in the Soviet Army. As for the fact that many of the commanders are yesterday's fedayeen boys, those men have learned the art of war on the battlefield and passed muster by hard experience. We have young people who are formally trained and who want to serve their homeland in the ranks of the NKR Army. They are the real future of our Army. I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to all staff officers from Karabakh who serve in the armies of Russia and other countries: Brothers, return to Karabakh, and let us defend our homeland together.

[Hovhannisian] What has been the principal accomplishment in the creation of the Army?

[Babayan] Today every soldier in our Army takes a ceremonious oath, and the orders of the commanders are being executed without objections at all levels. We also managed to end the practice of serving in the Army while staying home. Today we are strictly maintaining a barracks regime in our military.

I also consider an important accomplishment the creation of quite normal, technically satisfactory bases for different domains of military service. For example, we take pride in our tank repair facility where everything has been built on solid foundations.

Until recently our barracks were housed in buildings formerly occupied by schools and kindergartens. We have now built, with our own resources, barracks with basic facilities, training centers for different military units with their own firing ranges and other facilities.

[Hovhannisian] Doubts have been expressed in the foreign press that little Karabakh does not have the economic means to acquire such quantities of military equipment and that Armenia is helping us.

[Babayan] The first part of that statement is true. It is true that economically we are not that strong, especially in conditions of a blockade, to acquire as many weapons and as much ammunition as we have in our hands today. However, they are wrong about the sources of such acquisitions. We have captured 80 percent, if not more,

of our military means from the enemy. Various anecdotes circulate among our soldiers about this subject.

[Hovhannisian] For example, about one-time-use aircraft and tanks provided to us by Ukraine and Turkey through Azerbaijan.

[Babayan] As for the question of what is our military leadership focusing its attention on at this time, we believe that, having been defeated on land, the enemy will try to attack by air. Now we are working in that direction, with some success. [passage omitted]

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Tajik Opposition Leader: Struggle Against Communists to Continue

PM2312131593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Dec 93 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Tajikistan Opposition Leader Haji Akbar Turajonzoda by Arkadiy Dubnov of NOVOYE VREMYA and Dododzhan Atovulloyev of CHAROGI RUZ, for IZVESTIYA: date and place not stated: "Russian Troops Can Stay in Tajikistan, but on Specific Terms, Tajik Opposition Leader Says"]

[Text] The former spiritual leader of Tajikistan's Muslims is 39 years old. He graduated from the Islamic Institute in Tashkent and Jordan University in Amman. He was the qadigalon [Muslim judge who interprets and administers religious law] of Tajikistan from 1988 (after the accession to power of the People's Front, he was removed from this post and pronounced an "enemy of the people.") He was second in command in Central Asia's official Islamic hierarchy, a member of the Republic of Tajikistan Supreme Soviet Presidium, and he spoke out in favor of building a secular state.

Our meeting with the former qadi took place in conditions of secrecy in the capital of one of the southern republics of the CIS.

Addressing a press conference in Dushanbe, Turajonzoda once said that there are three instances when the qadi is not entitled to speak: if he is irritated, if he has not slept well, and if he is fasting. When we reminded him of these words he smiled and said that, thanks be to Allah, there was nothing preventing our work that day.

[Dubnov] A year has passed since Imomali Rakhmanov was elected chairman of the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet. You were the only opposition representative to send a congratulatory telegram to Rakhmanov, in which you proclaimed your readiness to promote a peaceful settlement to the war among Tajiks. However, you did not attend the actual session. Why?

[Turajonzoda] I knew Rakhmanov's character. He is a very hot-tempered man and a true communist. Despite all that, I welcomed his election for the sake of establishing peace and tranquillity.

But why did I myself fail to take part? I had reliable information that there were plans to deal with the opposition at the Leninabad session or after its conclusion. "You would be better off not going, as I cannot guarantee your safety," erstwhile Prime Minister Abdullodzhonov told me.

[Dubnov] How do you evaluate the situation in Tajikistan today?

[Turajonzoda] It was not difficult to predict what is now going on in my motherland. A regime which seeks by way of its basic task to instill fear in people and not self respect is in no state to last long. Absolutely nothing is sacred to these people, these authorities. Reviling democracy, and after making threats only a year ago to "the entire democratic scum, not only in Central Asia, but in Russia too" while swearing fidelity and friendship to Russia so as to ask it for aid—these people sing quite a different song in other places.

"If we (the government and the opposition) had fought against Russia together, we would not have the situation we have today, and we would not have spent two years fighting one another." This is a quotation from an interview given by Abdumadzhid Dostiyeu [name as transliterated], first deputy chairman of the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet, to Iran's KEYHAN.

But Imomali Rakhmanov persuaded Afghanistan's President Rabbani to help first and foremost the true Tajiks who had come to power in Tajikistan (that is, the people of Kulyab) so as to prevent Abdullodzhonov's Leninabad clan from "selling the republic to Russia and America." I was told about this by Borhanoddin Rabbani himself.

[Dubnov] And did you try to get in touch with the Russian leadership somehow to give it your point of view?

[Turajonzoda] I appealed to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin personally on several occasions. To judge from Moscow's policy, it can be concluded that Former Security Minister Barannikov and Russia's current ambassador in Tajikistan, Mecheslav Senkevich, did not present the president with all the information on the situation in Tajikistan.

However, I am inspired by the Russian president's edict on the appointment of a mediator to set up dialogue between the government in Dushanbe and the opposition, by Andrey Kozyrev's recent statements, and by the meeting between Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Chief Yevgeniy Primakov and Said Abdollahi Nuri, chairman of the Islamic Movement for the Revival of Tajikistan.

[Dubnov] The Tajikistan authorities describe you as one of the main culprits in the bloodshed. Do you consider yourself guilty of anything?

[Turajonzoda] Any man who enters the political arena always strives for power. I said that I would not seek to achieve any kind of state post, and I recognized that I

was mistaken when in September 1991 I agreed to be nominated as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. But, given that people had pinned enormous hopes on me, I simply wanted to help in the acquisition of independence, the revival of culture, and the attainment of religious freedom. When people say today that we wanted to seize power, they are lying.

[Dubnov] In the last nigh-on three years you have had several chances to become Tajikistan's number one. Do you regret not making the most of this?

[Turajonzoda] On several occasions I was asked by both political organizations and individual territories to run for the presidency, but I considered then as now that Tajikistan's spiritual leader should not be the leader of the state. We are accused of allegedly striving to impose Islamic order in Tajikistan. This is impossible. All the more so through force, and against the people's will and convictions. This kind of regime cannot last. It was impossible to impose from above something for which there existed no formulated demand in society. Could we, armed with this experience, do something so stupid? That would have been criminal. After all, all the mistakes I made while in office were ascribed to Islam.

[Dubnov] A coalition government was in power for a total of six months last year and peace was not brought to the country. It is asserted that this happened because the government was under your influence.

[Turajonzoda] The government comprised 90 percent communists, with only Vice Premier Davlat Usmonov [name as transliterated] representing us there, with myself in the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

[Dubnov] Where were you and your family when hostilities against the opposition began?

[Turajonzoda] At that time 49 of my relatives were killed. They were simply slaughtered in their own homes, in their native villages. My own home was first pillaged and then burned. The very same thing was done to my parents' home and the homes of my brothers. They even set light to the mosque next to my house. Three of my closest relatives, old men, were decapitated.

In February 1993 I managed to travel on foot across snow-covered mountain passes to reach the territory of Kyrgyzstan, as far as Osh, and then onward to one of Kazakhstan's oblasts, and from there I flew to Moscow.

We welcomed Rakhmanov's call for mutual disarmament by the armed formations. But instead of this, hostilities flared up against the opposition, and People's Front detachments occupied Dushanbe: the opposition was forced to take cover in the Garmo Hills and to retreat to Kofarnikhon.

Then we sent a delegation to Rakhmanov and Karimov requesting that there be no attack on Kofarnikhon and that, with the aid of the 201st Russian Division which

would be the guarantor of our safety, a start might at last be made on mutual disarmament. Rakhmanov ordered the delegation's arrest.

[Dubnov] It is said that you are the chief of the Tajik government in exile. Is this so?

[Turajonzoda] There is no Tajik government in exile. Even if the current government in Dushanbe stands down, we do not intend to take power into our own hands. Let people who have not participated in the war come to power. It is necessary with the help of Russia and other neighboring countries that we trust to disarm both sides and eventually, once the situation in the republic is fully stabilized, say in 18 months to two years' time, to hold free and democratic elections under the supervision of the United Nations, the CSCE, and other international organizations. Whoever wins the elections will lead the republic.

But until then, while the Communists remain, we will continue the armed struggle against them. We believe that this struggle is legitimate.

[Dubnov] You do not want to go into talks with official Dushanbe until you have set up contact with the Russian authorities. At the same time, it is considered in Moscow that the establishment of peace in Tajikistan is primarily the concern of the Tajiks themselves. If you continue to defend these stances, how will you break this vicious circle?

[Turajonzoda] Yes, we still want to meet with representatives of the Russian Government first, but this does not mean that we consider Russia our enemy. We recognize its geopolitical interests in the region. Russian troops can remain in Tajikistan. We want to see Russia

as a mediator. We want to explain our point of view—it is not important whether this is done officially or unofficially—and that is all! And if we convince Russia, then we will be prepared to sit around the negotiating table with representatives of the current regime in Dushanbe, with the exception of those people who were actual commanders the People's Front and who are responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of completely innocent people. There are upstanding people in the government with whom it is possible to talk.

The communists and democrats in the republic are incapable of reaching agreement without mediation and help from countries like Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. If Russia's stance remains unchanged, this will signify a continuation of the fratricidal war.

[Dubnov] How do you explain attacks by armed opposition detachments on border posts on the Tajik-Afghan border, the victims of which are the wholly blameless Russian soldiers?

[Turajonzoda] We deeply regret the fact that innocent Russian boys are dying. But show us another way of fighting against the hated regime in Dushanbe. What else can we do if Russian troops continue to defend it? After all, according to the agreement, border troops protect the border from foreign invasion. But we are citizens of Tajikistan, we want to go home, but we are being killed there. The border troops are preventing us from returning home with dignity. Our guys, when crossing the border, are instructed to bypass the posts and military units and not to enter into combat with Russian soldiers, but they pursue us onto Tajikistan territory and, you know, we are in our own country. I would very much like the Russian readers to put themselves in our shoes.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Grachev: 'Pressing Problems of Force Generation, Training'

94UM01284 Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 8, Aug 93 (Signed to press 16 Jul 93) pp 9-18

[Article by Gen Army P. S. Grachev, Russian Federation Minister of Defense; reprinted with permission from the editor of the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL: "Urgent Problems in the Development and Training of Russian Armed Forces Today"]

[Text] The end of the Cold War and positive changes in Eastern Europe and in the Far and Near East are creating fundamentally new conditions promoting a decrease in the level of military confrontation between the East and West, a transition from confrontation to cooperation, and consequently a soon-to-occur reduction in the probability of major wars.

At the same time the sources of military danger remain. Principal among them are the presence of sociopolitical, economic, territorial, religious, national, ethnic and other contradictions, and the persisting desire of a number of countries to resolve them by military force. All of this, as well as the breakdown of the unified defense system and the military infrastructure, is having an effect on Russia's military development.

The long economic crisis is the most important factor determining the course of military development. The transition to a market economy is gathering momentum today, and the production slump has been surmounted. This necessitated major review of a number of points in the state's military-technical policy, and required the Ministry of Defense to reexamine traditional approaches to outfitting and supplying the armed forces.

Thus, the current international situation and the internal political situation in Russia are developing under the influence of extremely contradictory factors, which is why the geopolitical and geostrategic realities on the planet must be accounted for in Russian military development.

Military policy is the foundation of military development, determining its orientation and content. The military-political situation that has evolved in the world arena, as well as in adjacent countries and in Russia itself, requires deep analysis of all of its aspects. We are striving to make military policy scientifically substantiated and realistic. Russia's rejection of ideological confrontation is a favorable basis for comprehensive cooperation, including military, with all states, but chiefly with the USA, European countries, Japan and neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region. Pursuing its military policy, as with any other state Russia must attach priority to its own interests, based on observance of the UN Charter and other international agreements. In this case the priority of political over military resources in preventing and resolving conflicts is being observed, the desire to maintain military-political and strategic stability under

the conditions of the new ratio of forces in the world arena is being maintained, and the armed forces and defense matters are under civilian control at all levels of government.

The essence of the state's policy regarding military security will be reflected in military doctrine, official adoption of which will promote a proper understanding of Russia's defensive goals and intentions by all states and the world community. Together with other documents it will become the basis for developing and training the armed forces and carrying out military reform, and defining the main directions for the development of military art and military science in general.

From my point of view the content of military doctrine must be based on new approaches to the issues of war and peace, and to supporting the country's defensive capability, with regard for the mutual security interests of all states. We have been able to surmount the direct threat of world war. However, we recognize that there are no guarantees yet that the positive changes are irreversible, and that maintaining the country's defense capabilities and strengthening its security are among the most important objectives of the state and the entire nation.

The political foundations of military doctrine will rest upon the Russian state's peace-loving policy. We do not intend to attack anyone or use military force to resolve interstate conflicts. The Russian Armed Forces are intended to repel aggression and to provide for the security of their people, and defend Russia's territorial integrity, sovereignty and other vitally important interests. The ways and means of preventing war and possible allies in reaching such an important objective must be examined in military doctrine in accordance with the main goal of the state's policy—ensuring peaceful conditions for the country's comprehensive development. Russia does not view any state of the world community as its enemy. At the same time it would be premature not to consider the realities that may generate tension in interstate relations.

Given the nature of my duties—the role of the Minister of Defense is reducing more and more to fulfilling military-political functions—I go abroad rather often, including to NATO countries. I should note that as is true of the leadership of the Russian Federation, the leadership of the North Atlantic alliance is troubled by the problems of developing a system of collective European and global security. We welcome NATO's departure from a strategy oriented on neutralizing the so-called threat from the former USSR and its allies.

At the same time a desire by some states (coalitions) to achieve domination over certain regions and the world as a whole, and to incite internal conflicts, which cannot but evoke natural anxiety in Russia, can be observed. We are forced to consider the probability of change in the political course of certain countries, possible attempts at rethinking postwar borders, and the maintenance of

armed forces by some states that exceed the needs of defense. Five hundred thirty divisions, 42,000 tanks and 12,000 warplanes are concentrated near Russia's borders. This impressive instrument of war and how politicians will use it in the future is a problem with many unknowns.

It is often said today that the situation in the world has changed fundamentally, and that the threat of aggression no longer exists because differences are disappearing from the ideologies of Russia and foreign countries. However, historical experience indicates that the ideas of peace and justice are often found as working concepts in the doctrines of states that are far from peace-loving. Military force is still one of the main instruments of the policy of a large number of countries.

We are especially alarmed on one hand by the possibility of proliferation of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons, their means of delivery and the latest technologies of military production, and attempts by some countries to use them to realize their own military-political goals; and on the other hand by the increasing threat of international terrorism, including with the use of such weapons. Growth of nationalistic and separatist tendencies and massive violations of universally recognized human rights and freedoms are seriously destabilizing the situation in the world.

Under these conditions Russia's military doctrine cannot but consider at least two contradictory tendencies: The first—the desire of nations to create a nonviolent world, to achieve civilized mutual relations, to reinforce measures of trust, and to exclude wars from the arsenal of the means of resolving disputes; the second—the desire of some states to solve international problems from a position of strength, to live by laws under which military force plays an important role in policy, if not the principal one. The latter tendency requires elevated attention, and were circumstances to come together in a particular way, it could bring on armed conflicts and wars.

When it comes to the military principles of doctrine *per se*, it would be suitable to reveal the nature of wars and armed conflicts; to determine the kind of aggression, which the state and its armed forces must be prepared to repel; to direct the development, training and means of combat use of the armed forces.

In evaluating military conflicts we need to base ourselves on the fact that the probability of world nuclear or world conventional war is significantly reduced under today's conditions. At the same time the possibility of armed conflicts, of local and regional wars, is not only the same, but it is also increasing. In my opinion the most probable thing would be not direct armed intervention against Russia but its gradually increasing involvement in conflicts started in neighboring countries and regions. Given the complex interrelationships and interdependencies in the interests of different states and peoples, any armed conflict can grow into a major war.

Considering the above, the following are the country's main objectives in the area of defense.

In peacetime: Preventing military conflicts through a combination of political, diplomatic and other measures and maintenance of the military potential and fighting power of the armed forces at a level ensuring reliable defense of the country's vitally important interests; guarding state borders; cutting off possible provocations and transgressions upon the security of citizens and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

In a period of danger and at the beginning of a war: Promptly adopting the decision to switch the country and the armed forces to a war footing, and practically implementing this decision; mobilizing the country's necessary forces and resources to repel the aggressor; using the possibilities of the United Nations and other international organizations to condemn and isolate the aggressor, and to force him to stop the war and restore peace.

Despite reduction of strategic defensive arms on the basis of START-2, it is obvious that nuclear weapons will continue to be the principal element of European and global stability today and in the foreseeable future. Therefore, we view strategic nuclear forces as the most important guarantee of the military security of Russia and its allies.

As far as the military doctrines of the USA and other developed states are concerned, they are experiencing certain changes as well. New focuses in evaluating the probability of different wars are a positive aspect of changes in doctrine. However, the general classification of wars adopted in the USA and NATO in the 1980's remains the same. Armed forces have the mission of preparing to fight any kind of war—universal (global) and limited, using nuclear or just conventional weapons, two-sided and coalitional, and of preparing for participation in any possible conflicts.

According to the principles of the USA's revamped military strategy, until the end of the 1990's and in the beginning of the next century the outcome of wars employing conventional weapons, should they be started, will be resolved in air, land and sea operations. Nuclear weapons must remain in the background, performing the role of strategic "deterrence." At the same time should the situation grow worse in the course of conventional wars, the possibility of using nuclear weapons is not excluded.

Thus in determining the new approaches to ensuring Russia's defense and military security, we need to base ourselves primarily on a comprehensive assessment of the current military-political situation, and of the changes that have already occurred and will occur in the world and in our country. The nature and tendencies in the development of the international situation and the internal situation in Russia and in CIS countries are creating exceptionally complex conditions for the development of Russian Armed Forces.

The main goal of the present stage of development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces is to create qualitatively new armies and fleets meeting the requirements of the present military, political and strategic situation in the world and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and reflecting the trends of its development and the real degree of military danger. In this case the numerical strength and structure of the RF Armed Forces must correspond to the missions assigned to them, to the economic, demographic and other possibilities of Russia, and to agreements on reducing armed forces.

As we know, Russia was among the last of the union republics of the disintegrated USSR to begin creating its own armed forces, but there were reasons for this. There was simply no other alternative in the situation that established itself by May 1992. The president, the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Defense had a question to answer: What should the Army and Navy be?

I feel that considering the geostrategic situation and the geopolitical interests of Russia, its armed forces must be highly mobile, and outfitted with modern equipment and armament. We need to do away with the large, slow-moving, hard-to-control armed forces of the former USSR which are now part of the Russian Army and Navy, but we also need to make maximum use of their potential. Our proposals have been supported by the country's leadership. In this case a real possibility has appeared for reducing the armed forces and easing the excessive burden of military expenditures.

Two highly important principles of ensuring military security are at the basis of the concept approved by the Russian president for the development of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces:

The first—deterring any aggressor from world nuclear and conventional war by maintaining the Strategic Nuclear Forces in a state allowing them to retaliate with the needed effectiveness under any conditions.

The second—deterring an aggressor from starting regional and local wars and armed conflicts by creating general-purpose force groupings (covering forces, mobile forces, Supreme High Command reserves) guaranteeing repulsion of aggression and ensuring the possibility for promptly augmenting the armed forces as the scale of military activities increases.

As we know, the Russian Armed Forces are being reorganized in stages.

With regard for current conditions, formation of new armed forces groupings on Russian territory has been started, planned reduction of their numerical strength and force composition is proceeding, reorganization of the central administration of the Ministry of Defense and of force structures and transition to a combined manning principle (through the draft and through voluntary enlistment on a contract basis) have been started, the principal measures associated with development of

the armed forces in the immediate future (up to 1995) have been determined more specifically, and the directions of their future reorganization (to the year 2000) are being developed. As a result of the work done thus far, the overall numerical strength of the Russian Army and Navy has been decreased by over 260,000 servicemen. There are plans for maximally decreasing the number of large combined units and units of reduced strength. An active effort is being made to conclude formation of a new military-technical policy having the main goal of comprehensively solving the problems of equipping the Army and Navy with contemporary models of armament and military equipment under the conditions of a significant reduction in appropriations, conversion of military industry and new economic relations. On the whole, the results of the first stage confirm the correctness of the selected course for development and reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces. However, the complex economic conditions in the country are making this work difficult.

Formation of the armed forces and the creation of the basis for their extensive transformation are foreseen in 1993-1995. During this period, creation of force groupings will be continued, withdrawal of forces from other countries into Russia will be basically completed, and the numerical strength of the armed forces will be reduced to 1.5 million persons by 1995, as determined by the law "On Defense." We concurrently plan to create a military infrastructure capable of supporting stable function of force groupings and their command and control in peace and in war. And finally, we need to carry out comprehensive research with which to substantiate the numerical strength, force composition and structure of the armed forces that will be required after 1995.

Later on (after 1995) we plan to finish establishment of qualitatively new armed forces, which means radically transforming their structure, switching to a combined manning system, forming force groupings, and creating the military infrastructure on Russian territory.

The planned volume and deadlines for development and reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces are naturally not written in stone. They will change under the influence of external and internal conditions.

In addition to the problems of developing the armed forces, developing the theory of the art of war is acquiring no less important significance. Under today's conditions the role of strategy is increasing significantly. It must first of all determine the nature and content of possible military conflicts, and the conditions under which they arise. It will predetermine the nature of tasks directed on one hand at finding effective military-political ways of averting war, and on the other hand at revealing the laws, principles, forms and means of preparing for and conducting armed conflict; at developing specific measures by which to prepare the country directly to repel aggression promptly and the means of

modern strategic development of the armed forces and their commitment to war; and at providing leadership to them.

Developing scientifically substantiated recommendations and the military-technical means of averting war should be considered to be the central task of the theory of strategy.

It stands to reason that world war must be averted chiefly by political means, and this should be reflected in defensive activity. As I see it, a prompt and adequate response to actions by an aggressor preparing for an attack may be considered to be the essence of deterrence. In peacetime this will force him to reject armed attack because of the inevitability of retaliation, while in wartime it will restrain him from using nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons, limit the scale and intensity of military actions, and force their termination under terms acceptable to us. The solution to this problem depends on the readiness to strike a possible adversary at any time with losses that would be unacceptable to him.

Taking this into account, important significance is attached in military art to developing a system of measures to prepare the country for the repulsion of possible aggression. The main ones are: Developing doctrinal principles and concepts defining the actions to be taken by the Russian Armed Forces to repel aggression; theoretically studying and practically mastering new forms of armed conflict and the most effective means of defeating enemy groupings; developing and practically implementing a new system of mobilizational deployment, and of preparing and committing reserves; improving the system for training staffs and forces; preparing effective fortifications in the Russian Federation.

Changes in the nature of military threats and defense objectives require more precise definition of the possible forms of strategic actions and combat use of armed forces. From my point of view, under today's conditions they may include: Strategic deployment of the armed forces (partial for armed conflicts and for local and regional wars, and full for repulsion of major aggression); use of armed forces in armed conflicts and in local and regional wars; use of armed forces in major war.

Strategic deployment of the armed forces has highly important significance to organized repulsion of aggression. The main requirement on it is that it be based on real military-political and operational-strategic conditions of carrying out missions in a particular evolving situation. This was rarely done in the past. There was often a gap between political and strategic considerations and the system of combat and mobilizational readiness. Consequently, the means and the organization of strategic deployment must develop with regard for the possibilities of potential adversaries for carrying out aggression in any form.

Under the new conditions, special attention should be turned to the theory of preparing and conducting strategic operations in regions (strategic sectors), which will

play the decisive role in conventional warfare. Unfortunately, in the postwar years the forces were ready either for offensive or for defensive forms of combat activities. This was hardly right. We cannot ignore the objective principles and laws of armed conflict. If an enemy begins aggression, we have the right to select and use those types, forms and means of military action which would be the most effective under the given situation. This could mean both offense and defense. In solving the problems of repelling aggression in different regions and sectors, we need to take a differentiated approach that accounts for the real political, economic and strategic situation. We must not give contiguous states the grounds for interpreting our actions as provocative, but at the same time we do not have the right to fall behind in the development of military affairs.

In preparing the armed forces we need to keep in mind that in the initial period of war, defense must ensure the possibility of successful repulsion of enemy aggression in the absence of previously fortified lines. They will have to be prepared in the course of the developing invasion—that is, simultaneously with conducting defensive engagements with forces that are not fully deployed. This is precisely the time when commanders of all ranks must display initiative in reasonably combining different means of conducting defensive operations. We are in favor of stubborn defense, but we must also know how to maneuver. This is especially important today. The field manuals of 1942 and 1943 contain special chapters devoted to defensive maneuver, but we have forgotten about it. In developing our guidelines we need to expand our treatment of this problem. It is now the turn for our military scientists working on the problems of operational art and tactics to make their contribution.

Offensive operations should obviously assume their place in the theory of military art as well. At the same time we cannot forget the counteroffensive, which was so widely employed during the Great Patriotic War.

A number of problems are arising in connection with air and air defense operations in a strategic area, and with the enemy's defeat in ocean and sea regions.

Given the present nature of armed conflict, the effectiveness of all forms of operations and of strategic and operational actions will depend to an increasingly greater degree on the reliability of troop command and control. The problems of raising the combat readiness of command and control units, the efficiency of their work, the viability of control posts and communication systems, and wide use of automated control resources have acquired special acuity. A number of immediate steps will have to be taken to raise the effectiveness of the principal forms of operational, psychological, technical and rear support.

All of this must be reflected in the manuals being currently written to regulate the use of the armed forces, and it needs to be meticulously honed in the course of operational and combat training. I feel that under

today's conditions we need to lay our emphasis mainly on preparing command and control units and maintaining them at a level ensuring dependable leadership of forces in both peace and war. Russia's complex economic position forces us to count every kopeck. This is why there are plans, in the immediate future, for training command and control units at command-and-staff exercises, which are to be carried out under the leadership of senior chiefs, with the wide use of automation resources. Of course, the best form of training of staffs and forces is major troop exercises. However, circumstances are evolving in such a way that we need to devote our main attention today to training tactical subunits, to teaching them to work together, and to developing firm skills in the personnel in the use of military equipment and weapons.

Fundamental changes in the military-political situation and in the development of the resources of armed conflict are raising the role of science, including military science, to an unprecedented level. This is explained by the fact that fundamentally new directions are opening up in the development of military affairs, by the continuing existence of possibilities for the armies of the most highly developed states to achieve military-technical superiority as a result of the creation of new models of high-precision weapons, as well as of weapons based on new physical principles with destructive force close to that of nuclear weapons, and by other factors. Military science is faced by extremely serious tasks associated with theoretical development of the problems of developing and using the armed forces, equipping them, and substantiating the structure and optimum composition of every armed service, branch of troops and special troops.

However, it should be noted that the economic difficulties the country is experiencing are having a negative effect on the solution of many problems. For example, while the models of attack resources we have are quite modern, in terms of many parameters we are behind in the resources of their information support, and in command, control and communication systems. We are behind in electronics, and without a highly developed microelectronic base, it is difficult to count on generally raising the country's industrial, scientific and technical potential, and on maintaining Russia's defense capabilities at a modern level. In the immediate future we need to consolidate the positions we have gained, and then devote special attention to technologies which predetermine the industrial might of the country and the fighting potential of the armed forces.

Nor can we ignore the technology of so-called artificial intelligence. In a number of countries (chiefly the United States of America) "artificial intelligence" resources, which represent the apex of technical progress, have already undergone their period of development and have earned the right of citizenship. They can be used in developing the armed forces, controlling combat activities and weapon systems, training the personnel, and so on. We are significantly behind in this area.

We also need to consider that shortcomings in modern combat systems and resources cannot be compensated by either military art or quantity, as was confirmed by the war in the Persian Gulf zone. In order to catch up, we need to conduct scientific research and experimental design work at a forced pace. In this case, the real influence scientific research has upon solving the practical problems of developing the armed forces and raising their combat readiness must be the main criterion of the effectiveness and results of this research.

Timely introduction of scientific accomplishments into practical activities is acquiring special significance. Solution of this problem involves improving the forms and methods of operational, mobilizational and combat training of troop command and control units. Scientific work in the forces and fleets must consist primarily of generalizing the experience of exercises and introducing research results into the practice of operational and combat training.

Research in military history requires revamping. Study of the experience of local wars is acquiring special significance today. Local wars and conflicts (both large and small) directly influence stability in the world, global development of policy and the disposition of military-political forces, as was confirmed by events in the Persian Gulf.

However, this does not mean that we should weaken attention to the Great Patriotic War—the richest treasure house of combat experience. In connection with celebration of the 50th anniversary of the war's most important events, we need to activate the study of military history with the purpose of deeply analyzing operations and extracting practically valuable lessons. Declassification of archival documents and materials should be considerably helpful. Objective analysis of these materials will make it possible to reveal both the sources of our victories and the causes of failures.

Thus, life itself is requiring us to create new armed forces and to eliminate the significant gap between the composition, structure and numerical strength of troop groupings inherited from the former USSR, and the real needs of Russia's defense, between the nature of modern wars and the traditional forms of the use of troop groupings. The most unique feature of solving these problems is that in addition to ensuring reliable defense of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the fatherland, and of its state interests against external threats, new tasks are arising before the armed forces today: Closely coordinating with bodies of state government and administration, making a transition to a new manning system, providing social protections to servicemen and their families, and resurrecting the prestige of military service and the system of military-patriotic values and ideals.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that the time has come to initiate broad discussion of all problems in the military-theoretical journal VOYENNAYA MYSL and other military publications, with the participation of scientists

and scientific collectives, in order to permit subsequent generalization and implementation of the most sensible ideas and proposals.

We are standing before the need for shaping, reorganizing and reducing the Russian Armed Forces, and within a short period of time at that. The desire to accomplish these tasks in one or two years is growing stronger in some circles of our society. However, the social, political and economic situation in Russia doesn't allow us to do this. Military development is proceeding under complex internal and international conditions, and it requires meticulous, extremely lengthy work.

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Tactics: Ambush in Modern Conditions

94UM01304 Moscow VOYENNNY VESTNIK in Russian No 8, Aug 93 (signed to press 16 Jul 93) pp 20-23

[Article by Colonel N. Utkin, candidate of military sciences: "Ambushes in Modern Conditions"]

[Text] Ambushes have not lost their importance. The reduction in the personnel strength of the armed forces and the increased demands on their combat effectiveness force them to look for the most effective methods of opposing the enemy. The article by Col N. Utkin on page 20 talks about how to improve the effectiveness of employing ambushes.

In recent years, the journal has more than once dealt with the issue of organizing ambushes by small subunits of the Ground Troops. Authors of articles have talked in detail about ambushes of the Great Patriotic War and shared experience acquired in the Republic of Afghanistan. As is clear from the articles, ambushes have not lost their importance today. On the contrary, the reduction in the personnel strength of the armed forces and the increased demands on their combat effectiveness force them to look for the most effective methods of opposing the enemy.

Ambushes were widely used in all types of combat. In an offensive they are usually set up on the path of withdrawing enemy subunits, on movement routes of enemy reserves and reinforcements, on supply routes, on sectors of a possible breakout of encirclement by defending groupings, and at sites of planned landing of sabotage-reconnaissance groups and airborne assault forces.

In some cases, the goal of ambushes involves making a surprise engagement of the enemy, misleading him as to the true intentions of friendly forces, and disrupting command and control. In other cases, the goal is to ascertain the composition and intentions of units being transferred to the forward edge of the battle area and to perform other reconnaissance measures.

In a meeting engagement, ambushes are created in forward units and by reconnaissance bodies on avenues of movement of superior enemy forces. The main task

here is to determine their location, composition, and nationality, and, if possible, reduce the pace of reaching a favorable line.

In the defense, ambushes acquire special importance in the security zone of defending forces and when conducting mobile combat operations. Small in makeup, they are situated between lines and on the line of withdrawal, in the first and subsequent trenches, at the forward position, at battle outposts, on the flanks, and in gaps. Ambushes are able to use surprise fire in short periods of time to inflict appreciable losses on advancing subunits, which front-line soldiers and Afghan veterans proved repeatedly.

In recent years, when the predominant part of power confrontations in the world took on the nature of armed conflicts and local wars, the importance of ambush operations have increased even more. Almost daily information is received about the use of ambushes in one or another region to capture weapons, equipment, or hostages, capture or destroy hostile groupings, and eliminate command and control bodies, politicians, and statesmen. In certain regions of the "near abroad," ambushes have become an almost everyday phenomenon.

All this indicates that today one must not be limited to introducing into combat training practice only experienced amassed in the past for organizing and conducting ambushes. This experience must be constantly improved, primarily based on comprehensive use of modern models of equipment and armament.

As is known, ambushes are sufficiently effective when well-trained, small subunits are assigned to them. The proportion of ambushes in their tactics is steadily increasing. Therefore, in my view, there is a need (if only from the standpoint of development of theory) to make more precise the concept apparatus as it applies to ambush operations and to define them by type.

For some reason, there is the opinion that ambushes are predominantly a sphere of activity of reconnaissance platoons and companies. Scouts, they say, are better trained; moreover, they have special equipment and gear... It seems, to some degree, this is not unfounded, especially if you consider that ambushes are examined in quite great detail when training reconnaissance bodies.

At the same time, there are numerous positive examples of operations in ambushes by subunits of other branches of troops as well. Ambush garrisons led by a military governor were created in Rus back in the 11th-13th centuries. Later, ambush regiments existed in the 13th-17th centuries. Surprise and swift attacks by small military units often had a decisive influence on the overall outcome of a battle. A graphic confirmation of this is the effectiveness of employing ambush detachments in the Kulikovo Battle, the events 1812, World War I, the Civil War, and the Great Patriotic War.

In our days, the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary gives several interpretations of this concept. The most successful

of them is the one defining an ambush as a "military (partisan) subunit located secretly and in advance for making a surprise attack against the approaching enemy." Here, it seems, it is necessary finally to arrange all points relative to typing ambushes according to composition and missions to be accomplished.

In my view, according to composition, they may be reconnaissance, motorized rifle, tank, antitank, artillery, flamethrower, aviation (helicopter, aircraft), antiaircraft, and finally special (chemical, engineer, and in the future those based on using weapons with new physical principles—combat robots, electronic, and so forth). Their basis will become individual fire weapons (combat and special), squads (crews), platoons, companies (batteries), or groups specially created for some period of time. Such formations can easily be reinforced with other forces and assets if necessary and made mixed or combined.

Ambushes can be broken down according to purpose into antitank, anti-personnel, anti-air, anti-landing, reconnaissance, false, containing, primary, alternate, and special ambushes.

As is known, the greatest effectiveness of an ambush is achieved if surprise is possible. The effect of unexpectedness is at work here. Fire from close range and a decisive attack inflict especially noticeable damage on the opposing side. For example, a tank crew under the command of Lieutenant P. Gudzya (later Hero of the Soviet Union and colonel-general) in a fast-moving battle near the village of Nefedovo (Moscow Oblast) in the fall of 1941 destroyed 10 out of 18 fascist tanks, making the rest beat a hasty retreat.

Speed of actions is equally important. You see, an enemy that has a several-fold force superiority to the ambush can cope with confusion, and then the situation will take shape not in the "hunter's" favor. In other words, subunits must be able to execute a quick disengagement and withdrawal. Experience amassed also attests to the need to provide (which officers sometimes forget, unfortunately) local security of ambushes so as not to be subjected to a surprise attack themselves.

However, I repeat: In addition to the need to take into account in training practice the experience of past years, something new must be added to it, based on a more complete use of the achievements of military science and the combat characteristics of modern equipment and armament. There are quite a few capabilities whose realization would have made it possible to increase the effectiveness of employing ambushes. I would like to call readers' attention to just a few of them.

It is no secret that mobile weapons operating, depending on the mission received, on a platoon—company scale or independently are usually used to set up the ambushes. With skilled organization of ambushes, the tanks, infantry combat vehicles, self-propelled artillery mounts, self-propelled antiaircraft mounts, and other weapons making up the ambushes in the vast majority of cases unnoticed by

enemy reconnaissance, and their surprise fire from close range prove to be deadly for its main body.

At the same time, the effectiveness of engaging the attacking forces will increase if artillery and air subunits enter the fighting. The fire of the senior commander's forces and assets not only will support the operations of those participating in the ambush and inflict even more damage on the enemy but also will to a considerable extent contribute to the successful disengagement and withdrawal of weapons to new positions. Therefore, it seems to me that suggestions about including artillery observers and air controllers with communications assets and means of transport are not unfounded.

However, there are a number of problems here. For example, questions of coordinating the ambush not only with artillery and aviation but also with subunits from which it is assigned remain on the agenda. In any event, I dare say that in Afghanistan a different trend was seen. Ambushes there sometimes ended up in a trap themselves, and in fighting a numerically superior enemy could only count on their own forces, since help from the outside was late.

Based on the specific tactical situation, it is advisable to allocate some mobile assets to occupy fire positions on the flanks and ahead of the forces defending in the security zone. They are to open surprise aimed fire on the enemy when he approaches effective fire range. When necessary (depending on the importance of the target), artillery and aviation fire is called in. It makes sense to use high-precision munitions for more reliable engagement of the enemy. After accomplishing the mission, combat vehicles withdraw under the cover of the senior commander's assets and take up their places in the dispositions of the subunit that sent them. Further development of this variant of operations involves the participation of other forces in destroying the enemy and in transforming ambushes into complexes of various weapons.

A second direction of their improvement is the use of two groups as part of the ambushes: Diversionary and combat groups, and in individual cases a prisoner "snatch" group (Figure 1). Such ambushes operated actively against the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan; and unfortunately, not without success. Diversionary groups sought in every way possible to create the greatest noise effect and delay the movement of our subunits with the aid of barriers, manmade landslides (Figure 2 [not reproduced]), and mixed minefields.

A diversionary group usually opened fire when clearing a passage in obstacles. The main role in engaging the enemy was assigned to the combat group "clearing" the way for the prisoner snatch group. After carrying out their mission, the rebels swiftly withdrew over pre-planned paths (in the vicinity of Feyzabad) or roads (in the vicinity of Ghazni).

A further increase in the effectiveness of this method of ambush operations is seen in using improved and advanced armament; for example, infrared sighting and observation devices, combat robots, remote-controlled weapons, and so




Figure 1. Organization of ambush based on experience of combat operations in Afghanistan

forth. The enemy can be pinned down by using remote minelaying devices, helicopter mobile obstacle construction detachments, and controlled minefields. Main engagement of the enemy is accomplished by using artillery, army aviation, remotely piloted vehicles, and others.

The third direction assumes creation of specially prepared combat assault groups [UBG's]. These groups fought in Vietnam and made a good showing. The composition of each of them during those years was limited to 3-4 people equipped with automatic weapons with silencers, "Mukha" rifle and handheld antitank grenade launchers, special mines, and portable radios.

Today, in my opinion, it is quite realistic to create up to 18 UBG's in a motorized rifle company and up to 54 UBG's in a motorized rifle battalion. Operating primarily at night on enemy-occupied territory (in the security zone after it is crossed by the advancing forces), each combat assault group, changing the ambush site two or three times a night, is able to destroy up to three enemy objects such as a tank, infantry combat vehicle, armored personnel carrier, electronic equipment, military equipment, command and staff vehicle, launcher, fuel supply vehicle, ammunition vehicle, and so forth. Consequently, a battalion's UBG's are able to destroy 150-200 pieces of armament and equipment in a 24-hour period.

Combat assault groups operating independently or in platoons could also remain in the enemy's rear area for some time after withdrawal of the forward detachment and conduct sabotage operations. To increase their survivability, in the planned area of operation it is advisable to set up in advance a network of bunkers with stores of ammunition, explosives, food, communications equipment, medicines,

and also to equip rest areas. In the future, combat assault groups could be part of special subunits intended for conducting ambushes, which, I am convinced, bear a specific nature and require special training.

In conclusion, I will note that today Russia's armed forces have amassed a large amount of experience in organizing and conducting ambush operations. Its importance in training troops is certainly very great. However, it will produce the most return only if new methods of operations are developed on its basis, fully corresponding to the modern nature of combined-arms combat.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS


Reform of Turkish Armed Forces

94UM0099A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Colonel Viktor Kostenyuk: "Turkey Bids Farewell to Infantry Brigades"]

[Text] In the new international situation Turkey has ended up in a zone of prolonged military-political instability, ethnic and national tension, border conflicts and aggressive terrorist activity. Under these conditions, increasing the Turkish Armed Forces' importance in securing NATO's southern flank and strengthening their role as a guarantor of their country's security required the Turkish leadership to revise a number of provisions of military doctrine and fundamentally reorganize its Army (see diagram for prospective structure).

GENERAL ISSUES



Turkey presently has the second largest Armed Forces in NATO, numbering up to 600,000 persons. They are armed with 3,600 tanks, around 3,000 armored combat vehicles, 5,000 artillery systems, 300 army aviation helicopters, 815 combat aircraft, and 136 ships of the main types. The Turkish command believes that this quantity of troops and combat equipment is sufficient to be ready to conduct defensive and offensive operations on two separate strategic axes, the Balkan and the Caucasian, in accordance with NATO requirements.

With this they can perform missions of defending national territory, holding the strategically important Black Sea straits, and conducting military operations to keep enemy troop from moving into Central Europe. The Turkish Armed Forces also support strategic movements of NATO reaction forces (particularly U.S. troops) to areas of armed conflicts in the Near and Middle East.

The new military doctrine has now made concrete functions of the Armed Forces for ensuring the country's territorial integrity and suppressing separatist actions, and has broadened the concept of defending Turkish interests outside of national territory. The possibility of giving military assistance to Muslim states of the former USSR and to other countries of the region has been incorporated conceptually. Turkish troops also can be used to participate in peacekeeping actions.

Performance of these and other missions requires bringing Turkish troops up to NATO standards and substantially increasing their mobility, striking power and firepower. They were inferior to leading European armies in many parameters until recently. The presence of a considerable number of obsolete arms and an acute shortage of modern combat equipment is the weakest point of the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, over 30 percent of these arms entered the troops 30-40 years ago and around half of the field artillery pieces and naval ships were made in the 1940's.

Therefore, the Turkish leadership planned a broad set of organizational and military-technical measures for a fundamental restructuring of their Armed Forces for the next decade.

First of all, the troops' organizational structure is being upgraded, which presumes standardization of formation and unit table of organization structures, a transition from division-regimental to a more flexible brigade-battalion basis, and formation primarily of mechanized and armored brigades. The increase in the number of formations of these types to 70 percent of the Army combat force level by the year 2000 will increase its striking power and offensive capabilities significantly. It is planned to strengthen the troop grouping stationed in the eastern part of the country (2nd and 3rd field armies) and targeted against the Transcaucasus.

The number of airmobile commando brigades with Army aviation battalions in their makeup is being increased to ensure a prompt reaction to threats that

arise suddenly. Formation of specialized heavy motor transport regiments for moving one centrally subordinate armored brigade and four tank battalions (one in each field army) will contribute to a substantial increase in troop mobility. In addition, it is planned to establish one or two airmobile battalions in each field army as assault transport helicopters are delivered to the troops.

The military organizational development plan envisages reoutfitting all branches of the Armed Forces through arms and military equipment deliveries from the United States and Central European countries, modernizing obsolete models and producing new arms under license. Deliveries to the Army of over 1,100 tanks, around 2,700 armored combat vehicles, over 500 self-propelled artillery systems, and 200 combat helicopters will be completed before the year 2000. Up to 270 fighter-bombers, 50 attack aircraft, and 80 medium and light military transport aircraft will enter the Air Force inventory in this same period. The Navy modernization program envisages having up to 40 new ships of basic types in the Navy order of battle by the end of the millennium.

Reform of the Turkish Armed Forces presumes improved manning of formations and units with a reduction in the overall number of personnel. The number of servicemen in the Air Force and Navy will remain essentially unchanged, while the Army makeup will be reduced by almost a third. Terms of service for privates and NCO's will be reduced from 15 to 12 months beginning in 1995. The proportion of volunteers performing duty on a contractual basis will increase along with this. Counting regular officers, the overall number of professional servicemen may reach 40 percent in the Army and over 80 percent in the Air Force and Navy in ten years.

An improved mobilization system called upon to support formation and unit deployment in shorter time periods is being introduced within the scope of military reform. Along with the fully deployed units, training and cadre units are being preserved and will serve as a base for mobilizing a considerable number of new formations. The presence of so-called green units and subunits will permit establishing territorial self-defense forces on their basis in wartime, deploying troops to reinforce the Army, and bringing the number of personnel in combat units up to wartime strength levels. Armed Forces overall numerical strength can be more than doubled in a month with that mobilization deployment procedure.

Finally, Armed Forces restructuring envisages increased effectiveness and stability of command and control by reorganizing staffs at all levels, making comprehensive use of automated command and control systems, adopting modern jam-protected communications equipment, and improving the staff operational training system.

Western experts believe that full implementation of the plan for restructuring and modernizing the Turkish Armed Forces will increase their design combat potential

by one and one-half to two times. But the shortage of funds, constant dependence on foreign military aid and weapon deliveries, and poor capacities of national military industry may threaten fulfillment of a number of very important military-technical programs. The planned volume of new arms production and procurements for the next decade exceeds \$15 billion, while Turkey's real financial capabilities are considerably lower.

Japan's Reluctance To Join ABM Development Project Eyed

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[Sergey Agafonov report: "United States Forcing New ABM System on Japan"]

[Text] Tokyo—America's intention to involve the Japanese in the development of a new ABM system to counter intermediate-range ballistic missiles in all parameters is becoming an obsession as far as Washington is concerned. Tokyo has not experienced such pressure in a long time.

Let us recall that the topic was broached for the first time at expert level at the end of this summer, after which a U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense came to Tokyo to "push" the idea and was followed by the Secretary himself. The subject has also been explained to the head of the Japanese cabinet, including at top-level meetings with the U.S. President. Tokyo is clearly in no hurry to give a positive reply but the lack of feedback is simply making the Americans even more persistent—it has come to light that the next round of special talks on the missile project is scheduled for 15 December in Hawaii, and this haste is due to the Americans' insistence.

The Americans are pressuring Tokyo by consciously fueling passions over North Korea's missile successes. Indeed, it all began with those successes. As soon as it became known that the DPRK had successfully tested its latest ballistic development [razrabotka] with an operational radius of 1,000 km and can now potentially "reach" virtually anywhere on Japanese territory, the

U.S. side began actively exploiting Japan's natural concern. The thesis of the North Korean threat was rapidly fostered in Japan and many people in the country took fright—due to Pyongyang's reputation for unpredictability and the fact that the Japanese have no effective means of protection against such weapons. Meanwhile, U.S. sources added new elements to the story and fanned those fears.

People in Tokyo have begun talking with renewed force about Pyongyang's military superiority, contrasting this superiority with Japan's defenselessness against North Korea's missiles.

The U.S. attempts to involve Japan in the development of the new ABM system is based meanwhile not so much on military factors as on economic ones—it will cost at least \$12 billion which, given the present defense spending cuts, does not exist. There is another factor—technological questions. The U.S. side is proposing the Patriot system as the basis of the design project, a system which must be properly "upgraded" using a number of Japanese technologies which the Americans do not possess. Tokyo can easily read between the lines here and see all this and is determinedly shying away from the U.S. proposals. It is certainly not a question of money or the prospect of sharing technological innovations that worry the Japanese here. Those who know about these things believe that there are two other factors which are proving the main obstacle to progress—first, the implementation of the U.S. proposal requires substantial adjustments to Japan's defense policy and objectively necessitates a review of a whole range of related problems, including the Japanese-U.S. security treaty itself; second, the Patriot system does not inspire great hopes as a worthy basis for the design—during the Persian Gulf war its effectiveness against Iraq's missiles, whose characteristics are close to those of North Korea, was lamentably low.

It is noteworthy that recently the Japanese mass media have been spreading reports on the inadequacies and deficiencies of the Patriot system and on the vagueness of the very concept offered by the United States. This counterattack mounted against the U.S. obsession is gaining momentum at such an admirable rate that the prospect of the forthcoming talks in Hawaii is already in doubt—the Japanese do not intend "subscribing" to the Pentagon's venture at the moment.

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